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ACHIEVING PRIVACY
Anupam Chander,* Meaza Abraham,** Sandeep Chandy,***
Yuan Fang,**** Dayoung Park***** & Isabel Yu******

Is privacy a luxury for the rich? Remarkably, there is a dearth of literature evaluating whether data privacy is too costly for companies to implement or too expensive for governments to enforce. This paper is the first to
offer a review of the costs of compliance and to summarize national budgets for enforcement. Our study suggests that, while privacy may indeed
prove costly for companies to implement and may present a special burden
for small and medium-sized businesses, it is not too costly for governments
to enforce. Indeed, the European Union, seen as a global champion of privacy, expends less than a dollar a year per citizen on data protection enforcement. Effective data protection agencies are not prohibitively costly,
even for small administrations, especially if they collaborate through regional bodies. This study will help inform governments as they fashion and
implement privacy laws to address the “privacy enforcement gap”—the
disparity between privacy on the books and privacy on the ground.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

S privacy a luxury for the rich?1 This Article seeks to understand how
much data privacy laws cost to implement and enforce. Relying on
industry surveys, government studies, and government agency budgets, this Article compares the costs of private sector implementation and
public sector enforcement for the United States, the European Union,
and to a limited extent, China. We conclude that data privacy is not
outside the reach of the poorer parts of the world, though the rules
should be written with attention to differing resources for compliance and
enforcement.
The focus of this project is to help provide the informational base
needed to support the practical realization of data privacy protections.
Like some other legal domains, data privacy laws are subject to an “enforcement gap—that is, a wide disparity between the stated protections
on the books and the reality of how companies respond to them on the
1. Julia Angwin, Opinion, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxurygood.html [https://perma.cc/9AJ4-XVDL].
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ground.”2 A decade ago, Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan observed that “no one has conducted a sustained inquiry into how corporations actually manage privacy and what motivates them.”3 Their study
described how companies were responding to regulations and enforcement.4 But even a decade later, we know too little about the costs of
compliance or enforcement. Despite the rapid embrace of laws designed
to regulate the use of personally identifiable information, there is a remarkable scarcity of studies about their costs.5 The absence of data
makes it difficult to assess possible regulatory measures in the area. Some
in developing nations may be worried about the costs of compliance with
new regulations for small and medium-sized companies. Governments
too may also be concerned about the additional costs of enforcing new
laws.
This study begins to fill that lacuna by describing the costs of compliance with data privacy laws for businesses and the costs of enforcement
for governments. By focusing on costs, the study should not be read in
any way to neglect benefits. A wide array of scholarship and experience
has shown that privacy regulations have widespread benefits.6 Indeed, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union all declare privacy a fundamental human right.7 Benefits of data privacy are difficult to quantify outside of clear invasions like
identity theft.8 Not only does data privacy have enormous benefits for
2. Filippo Lancieri, Narrowing Data Protection’s Enforcement Gap, 74 ME. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).
3. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 249 (2011).
4. Id. at 251.
5. We discuss the existing studies in Part III below. This paper relies on a number of
different sources. The principal sources are the laws and regulations of the United States,
the European Union, and China, scholarly and professional studies of the operation of the
privacy regimes of these three jurisdictions, and government reporting on budgets in these
jurisdictions. We supplemented these sources with both expert interviews and a survey that
we designed and circulated.
6. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408 (2008)
(“The core of intellectual privacy is the freedom of thought and belief.”); Julie E. Cohen,
What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) (“[F]reedom from surveillance. . . is foundational to the practice of informed and reflective citizenship”); Alessandro
Acquisti, Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442 (2016) (reviewing economic literature on privacy).
7. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, (Dec. 10,
1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (registered ex officio Mar. 23, 1976); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union 326/02, arts. 7, 8, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 397.
8. While certain harms caused by data abuse are more readily calculable—such as
those from identity theft—the harms from many data violations can be hard to assess.
Thus, the full benefits of data protection are difficult to quantify. When describing the
impact of a change to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) rules
in 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) noted that it was “not
able to quantify the benefits of the rule due to lack of data and the impossibility of monetizing the value of individuals’ privacy and dignity.” Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy,
Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5567 (Jan. 25,
2013).
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individuals, but it also helps companies build and maintain the trust of
their users and their business partners.9 Indeed, understanding the costs
of compliance and enforcement will better enable developing countries to
design their laws and enforcement structures.
Across the world, nations are establishing data privacy rules.10 The
datafication of the economy means that few companies or individuals are
untouched.11 Laws regulating the use of personally identifiable data are a
necessary foundation of the digital economy.12 Companies are collecting
data at an unprecedented rate as computers mediate more and more of
our lives.13 Laws help prevent abuse and thus help build trust as individuals interact in an increasingly digitized world.14 Data privacy is a necessity
not just in richer nations, but in poorer ones as well.15
Achieving data privacy presents special challenges in the developing
world—both for companies and governments.16 Micro, small, and medium-sized companies may lack the resources to ensure compliance with
complicated laws.17 If compliance is too expensive, businesses may simply
ignore the law or avoid the jurisdiction altogether. Governments, their
resources already stretched, may not be able to devote sufficient resources to privacy enforcement.18
Data privacy is also increasingly critical to international trade.19 As
data travels across the world, governments and individuals seek to ensure
that privacy protections travel alongside the data.20 At the same time,
data regulations that mandate data localization impose special costs; for
example, data regulations can be used to disfavor foreign service
9. Michael Fimin, Five Benefits GDPR Compliance Will Bring to Your Business,
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/03/
29/five-benefits-gdpr-compliance-will-bring-to-your-business/?sh=7af021b4482f [https://
perma.cc/LB6A-94AE].
10. Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE &
DEV., https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-DataProtection-Laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/EVJ8-W2AR].
11. Irving Wladawsky-Berger, How Datafication Will Redefine Business and Society,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2015, 12:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CIOB-7334
[https://perma.cc/T9MA-D2TS].
12. Ralph Schroeder, Big Data Business Models: Challenges and Opportunities, 2 COGENT SOC. SCIS. 1, 12–13 (2016).
13. Wladawsky-Berger, supra note 11.
14. See Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy-security [https://
perma.cc/6AQN-TAV2].
15. See Linnet Taylor & Dennis Broeders, In the Name of Development: Power, Profit,
and the Datafication of the Global South, 64 GEOFORUM 229, 236 (2015).
16. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Data Protection Regulations and International Data Flows: Implications for Trade and Development, at xii, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DTL/STICT/2016/1 (2016).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2021: DATA FOR BETTER
LIVES 237 (2021) [https://perma.cc/8UUQ-CRE7].
20. Id. at 238.
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providers.21
We focus here on three specific data privacy regimes: the European
Union, the United States, and China. Because of their large economies,
these data privacy regimes have global influence.22 This study seeks to
elaborate and quantify the costs of data regulations, recognizing the limitations of the data available. Because the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and various U.S. laws are already in
place, we can illuminate the experience of companies complying with
those laws. We also describe the costs of enforcement.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins by briefly characterizing
three of the major data protection regimes: the European Union, the
United States, and China. Part III then describes the costs of private sector compliance with respect to each of these three regimes. Part IV turns
to the costs of public enforcement, again for these three different
jurisdictions.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO DATA PRIVACY: THE E.U., THE
UNITED STATES, AND CHINA
We focus on three principal jurisdictions in this study: the European
Union, the United States, and China. The rules in each of these jurisdictions have evolved significantly in recent years and continue to evolve, so
any account of their costs inevitably describes a moving target. In order
to better understand the price of compliance and the costs of enforcement, we first summarize the major features of each regime below, drawing out some of the key approaches to compliance in these jurisdictions.
A. COMPLIANCE UNDER

THE

E.U. DATA PRIVACY REGIME

The GDPR requires that every entity processing personal data must
have a legal basis to do so such as consent, or because the processing of
personal data is necessary for the performance of a contract.23 If that
basis is consent, that consent must be “freely given, specific, informed
and unambiguous.”24 Personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly,
21. Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 679
(2015); MARTINA FRANCESCA FERRACANE & ERIK VAN DER MAREL, REGULATING PERSONAL DATA: DATA MODELS AND DIGITAL SERVICES TRADE 3 (2021), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35308/Regulating-Personal-Data-DataModels-and-Digital-Services-Trade.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=Y [https://perma.cc/
ZH25-6WC4].
22. RACHEL F. FEFER & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10896, EU DATA
PROTECTION RULES AND U.S. IMPLICATIONS 2 (2020); Alexa Lee, Personal Data, Global
Effects: China’s Draft Privacy Law in the International Context, NEW AM. (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/personal-data-globaleffects-chinas-draft-privacy-law-in-the-international-context [https://perma.cc/KC6ENR42].
23. Commission Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 36 [hereinafter GDPR].
24. Id. art. 4(11).
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and transparently; collected for specified and legitimate purposes; “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”; accurate; kept no longer than
necessary for such purposes; and “processed in a manner that ensures
appropriate security.”25 It gives data subjects the rights to be informed, to
access and rectify data, to be forgotten, to restrict processing, to data
portability, and to object to certain processing of their data.26 The GDPR
mandates that data controllers and processors adopt the principle of “privacy by design,” seeking to implement data-protection principles in their
products and taking into account costs of implementation and risks for
data subjects.27 For data processing activities that pose high risks to data
subjects, the GDPR requires that data controllers carry out data protection impact assessments.28 In addition, data controllers and processors
may have to designate data protection officers when, for example, carrying out large-scale processing of special categories of data.29 The GDPR
even goes beyond data privacy by, for example, giving each person the
right to choose to not be subject to automated decision-making that produces legal effects on that person.30
Because the GDPR adopts a risk-based approach, an organization’s
compliance obligations and related expenditures vary considerably depending on the risks posed by an organization’s data collection or
processing activities.31 A risk-based approach allows for the differential
application of the GDPR according to the type of data, the nature and
size of the organization, and the uses of that data.32 Data collection or
processing that presents considerable risks to the rights and freedoms of
data subjects by virtue of the nature, scope, context, and purpose of
processing are high risk under the GDPR.33 Examples may include
processing based on new technologies and extensive automated decisionmaking with legal effects.34 The procedures required for such high risk
data collection and processing may include, for example, mandatory data
protection impact assessments in which processing risks are identified,
safeguards are presented, and (in certain cases) consultation with a Data
Protection Authority is required before proceeding.35 Furthermore, organizations are required to take the appropriate technical and organiza25. Id. art. 5.
26. Id. arts. 13–21.
27. Id. art. 25.
28. Id. art. 35.
29. Id. art. 37.
30. Id. art. 22.
31. See European Commission, The GDPR: New Opportunities, New Obligations, at 3
(2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/data-protection-factsheet-sme-obligations_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYB7-6RM4].
32. GDPR News, What Is High Risk Under GDPR?, COMPLIANCE JUNCTION (Dec. 22,
2017), https://www.compliancejunction.com/high-high-risk-gdpr [https://perma.cc/69PS9YR8].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 35–36.
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tional measures to properly safeguard personal data pursuant to the
regulation’s policy of data protection by design and default.36
B. COMPLIANCE UNDER

THE

U.S. DATA PRIVACY REGIME

The U.S. data privacy regime lacks a comprehensive law that regulates
the collection and processing of personal data of U.S. residents by private
parties.37 While there are constraints against government information collection through both the U.S. Constitution and an extensive statutory
framework regulating government use of personal data, there is no similarly broad federal regulatory privacy law regulating private parties.38 Instead, the current data privacy framework arises out of a patchwork of
federal and state laws, many of which are focused on a particular sector
of the economy.39 Outside specified areas, the focus is limited to enforcing the privacy promises that businesses make to users rather than on
specific mandates setting out what businesses can and cannot do with
data.40 Sectoral laws include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),41 covering the health industry, and the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA),42 covering the financial sector. In
addition, the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) gives the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) broad authority to regulate data practices if
they constitute “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”43 Through the FTCA, the FTC serves as the nation’s de facto
privacy regulator, and its settlements create a kind of common law of
privacy.44
HIPAA imposes an extensive set of privacy protections for personal
health data gathered by covered entities, including hospitals, healthcare
providers, and health insurers.45 Not only must health plans and healthcare providers give patients a written notice of their privacy practices,
they must also “maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative,
36. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 25.
37. Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/U33F-DLN3].
38. See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF11207, DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019); 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b) (regulating agency disclosure of records).
39. O’Connor, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., Snapchat Settles FTC Charges that Promises of Disappearing Messages
Were False, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were [https:/
/perma.cc/6RE8-88WT].
41. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936.
42. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
43. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2015);
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
44. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585–86 (2014).
45. C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20500, MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE HIPAA FINAL RULE (2001).
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physical, and technical safeguards to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information” and “to protect against any reasonably anticipated threats.”46 These safeguards include “designating a privacy official,
training employees, and developing a system of sanctions for employees
who violate the entity’s policies.”47 HIPAA also requires the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to “adopt security standards that
take into account the technical capabilities of record systems used to
maintain health information; the costs of security measures;” and “the
value of audit trails in computerized record systems.”48 The DHHS has
extensively used its rule-making authority to elaborate on the statute.
The GLBA (also known as the Financial Modernization Act) regulates
the use of non-public personal information by institutions or businesses
engaged in financial activities such as banks, insurers, and brokerage
firms.49 The GLBA empowers the FTC to enforce the obligations that
establish standards for financial institutions relating to administrative,
technical, and physical information safeguards.50 Covered entities are obligated to protect any personal information collected about an individual
in connection with providing a financial product or service, unless that
information is otherwise publicly available.51
California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which went into effect at
the beginning of 2020, will have a significant impact, especially on larger
enterprises.52 The nation’s first comprehensive privacy law regulating
commercial enterprise, the CCPA has a broad reach outside of California,
covering all companies that do business in California and either (1) have
an annual gross global revenue in excess of $25 million, (2) handle the
personal information of at least 50,000 California residents, or (3) derive
half or more of their revenue from selling consumers’ personal information.53 Because many businesses in the United States (and elsewhere)
meet this threshold, the CCPA effectively governs most multinational
corporations (wherever they are based) that serve the United States.54
The CCPA requires businesses to disclose the types and sources of personal data the business collects from customers and grants California residents the right to access and delete personal information.55 The CCPA
thus relies largely on a notice and consent model. Rights under the CCPA
include the right to be notified about what personal information is col46. § 1173(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 2026.
47. REDHEAD, supra note 45, at 5.
48. § 1173(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 2025–26.
49. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436 (1999).
50. Id. §§ 501, 505, 113 Stat. at 1436–1437, 1440.
51. Id. § 509, 113 Stat. at 1444.
52. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100 to .199.100 (Deering 2018); see Anupam Chander,
Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV.
1733, 1734 (2021).
53. CIV. § 1798.140. Accordingly, beyond curtailing certain forms of punishment, the
Eighth Amendment now—in addition to placing restraints on prison officials—also imposes significant duties upon these officials
54. See Chander et al., supra note 52, at 1772.
55. CIV. §§ 1798.100, 1798.105.
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lected and the right to opt out of the sale of that information.56 The
CCPA-based right to access information will require substantial reworking of data practices at companies that have not previously created systems to manage the personal information they store, such as data
inventory mapping.57 The opt-out feature provided by the CCPA will also
require companies to create mechanisms for such requests and treat data
differently depending on the choices consumers have made.58 The CCPA
is principally enforced by California’s Attorney General.59 In November
2020, California voters passed the California Privacy Rights Act, which
adopts principles of data minimization and purpose limitation, requires
risk audits for high-risk activities, and will establish a new California Privacy Protection Agency when it goes into full effect in 2023.60
C. COMPLIANCE UNDER

THE

CHINESE DATA PRIVACY REGIME

China’s data privacy regime is the newest of the three jurisdictions described in this Article. It is best understood against the backdrop of
China’s development as a leading technological power that has simultaneously sought to maintain strong governmental control and public order.61
China’s approach reflects a nearly decade-old “national strategy to embrace ‘big data.’”62 With its data protection laws, China has embraced
three goals simultaneously: to protect citizens’ lawful interests, to protect
networked information security, and to protect national security and public order.63 A fourth goal, the promotion of China’s technological advancement, has also been a key consideration in its implementation of
data protection laws.64
56. Id. §§ 1798.110, 1798.120.
57. Mark Brennan, James Denvil & Aaron Lariviere, The Challenge Ahead—Data
Mapping and the CCPA, HOGAN LOVELLS (Sept. 19, 2018), https://
www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/the-challenge-ahead-data-mapping-and-the-ccpa_1 [https://perma.cc/9AJ3-QSTD].
58. George P. Slefo, Bracing for Sweeping New Data Privacy Law; How Brands Are
Preparing as the California Consumer Privacy Act Becomes a Reality in 2020, ADAGE (Oct.
14, 2019), https://adage.com/article/news/how-brands-are-preparing-californias-privacy-actbecomes-reality-2020/2205586 [https://perma.cc/3MEC-ZVFE].
59. See CIV. § 1798.155.
60. See California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), PERKINS COIE, https://
www.perkinscoie.com/en/practices/security-privacy-law/california-privacy-rights-actcpra.html [https://perma.cc/PD8R-2J36].
61. See Emmanuel Pernot-Leplay, China’s Approach on Data Privacy Law: A Third
Way Between the U.S. and the EU?, 8 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 49, 69 (2020).
62. Jinting Deng, Should the Common Law System Welcome Artificial Intelligence: A
Case Study of China’s Same-Type Case Reference System, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 223, 227
(2019). As Lu Chuanying, a scholar with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies,
describes, China has become a “leading data power (
) on a global scale.” Graham
Webster & Rogier Creemers, A Chinese Scholar Outlines Stakes for New ‘Personal Information’ and ‘Data Security’ Laws, NEW AM. (May 28, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/
cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/chinese-scholar-outlines-stakes-new-personal-information-and-data-security-laws-translation [https://perma.cc/Q8ZP-U99Y].
63. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 69.
64. James L. Schoff & Asei Ito, Competing with China on Technology and Innovation,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Oct. 10, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/
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State security has been a focus of Chinese data policy from the start.65
The Golden Shield—nicknamed the “Great Firewall of China”—sought
to ensure that the internet would not be used to disseminate information
that might threaten public order, but instead might be used to create “an
ennobling space where netizens complete their transformation into perfect citizens.”66 Typically, data protection policies are focused on the protection of the data of individuals and not on the promotion of state
interests.67 However, data protection policies—by their nature—expand
regulatory control over the activities of private companies and individuals, paving the way for China to operate its web and flow of data under
the model of a cyber-sovereignty.68 By focusing on state security, China
prefers to implement regulations such as data localization laws to keep all
its information within its borders, which enhances its ability to monitor
and regulate information.69
In 2016, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued Administrative Rules on Information Services via Mobile Internet Applications (the App Rules), seeking to directly regulate China’s burgeoning
app industry.70 These rules require app providers to obtain any necessary
licenses or qualifications required of information services, make clear the
nature and scope of data collection and use, and obtain consent from
users before using location, address book, and camera features.71 App
providers are also required to register the real names of their users, as
part of an information content review.72 The Cybersecurity Law also imposes real name registration obligations for information publishing and
instant messaging services.73 The ability to identify the user can be useful
for the government in identifying lawbreakers, though human rights advocates have raised concerns about such requirements.74
The cornerstone of China’s data protection law can be found in the
Cybersecurity Law enacted in 2016 by the Standing Committee of the
2019/10/10/competing-with-china-on-technology-and-innovation-pub-80010 [https://
perma.cc/24WM-Y7CU].
65. See Lorand Laskai, Nailing Jello to a Wall, in CONTROL 192, 194 (Jane Golley,
Linda Jaivin & Luigi Tomba eds., 2016).
66. Id. at 195.
67. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 69.
68. Laskai, supra note 65, at 197.
69. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 104–05.
70. China: Cyberspace Administration Releases New Rules on Mobile Apps, LIBR.
CONG. (July 26, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2016-07-26/chinacyberspace-administration-releases-new-rules-on-mobile-apps [https://perma.cc/5TX4SC3R].
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. JONES DAY, IMPLEMENTING CHINA’S CYBERSECURITY LAW 2 (2017), https://
www.jonesday.com/files/upload/Implementing%20Chinas%20Cybersecurity%20Law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SBK-D4GS].
74. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The ‘Chilling Effect’ of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 10, 2015, 3:27 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/chinanew-cybersecurity-law-internet-security [https://perma.cc/4BTQ-GKRC].
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National People’s Congress.75 That law imposes numerous data protection obligations on “network operators,” which are defined broadly to
include network owners, managers, and network service providers.76 A
central obligation is the requirement to obtain consent before collecting
or sharing personal information.77 While the laws themselves pose their
requirements in very broad language, the government has provided guidance on their interpretation. In 2017, a technical committee supervised
by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the Standardization Administration of China issued the National Standard of Information Security Technology—Personal Information Security Specification (2018
Specification), which became effective in 2018.78 While non-binding, the
2018 Specification has proved highly influential, establishing what has
been described as a set of best practices related to data protection.79 The
government relies on this standard for enforcement actions.80 The 2018
Specification often goes beyond the statutory text; for example, while the
Cybersecurity Law requires only that companies do not gather personal
information unrelated to the services they provide, the Specification goes
further to limit collection only to information that is necessary.81
A revised Specification went into effect on October 1, 2020.82 This 2020
Specification mandates affirmative (opt-in) consent for processing sensitive personal information.83 It also requires fully informed consent for the
75. Wangluo Anquan Fa (
) [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective
June 1, 2017).
76. Id. arts. 9, 76.
77. Id. arts. 22, 41, 42.
78. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 76 n.119; Yan Luo & Phil Bradley-Schmieg,
Inside Privacy: Updates on Developments in Data Privacy and Cybersecurity, COVINGTON
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/china/china-issues-new-personal-information-protection-standard [https://perma.cc/2P3N-MRCW].
79. China Releases Draft Amendments to the Personal Information Protection Standard, COVINGTON (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2019/02/china_releases_draft_amendments_to_the_personal_information_
protection_standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MF8-9CT6]. Our interviewees confirmed that
the Specifications were taken seriously, despite not having the force of law. See infra note
113 and accompanying text.
80. Jenny (Jia) Sheng & Chunbin Xu, China Publishes Best Practices for Protection of
Perosnal Information, PILLSBURY, https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/
china-publishes-best-practices-for-protection-of-personal-information.html[https://
perma.cc/2A4Q-CR7M].
81. Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 75, art. 41;
Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 94–95.
82. Michelle Chan, Clarice Yue & Tiantian Ke, China Cybersecurity Law Update: Two
New National and Industry Standards: Personal Information Specification and Personal Financial Information Specification Officially Published!, BIRD & BIRD (Apr. 2020), https://
www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2020/china/china-cybersecurity-law-update-two-newnational-and-industry-standards[https://perma.cc/8S6N-NQZY].
83. Id.; HOGAN LOVELLS, THE DUST HAS FINALLY SETTLED—THE LONG JOURNEY
OF CHINA’S NEW PERSONAL INFORMATION SECURITY SPECIFICATION 1–2 (Apr. 2020). An
official English translation of the 2020 Specification is available here: https://
www.tc260.org.cn/front/postDetail.html?id=20200918200432 [https://perma.cc/BY9JXZ82].
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collection and use of biometric information.84 The 2020 Specification requires a data protection officer for organizations that process the personal information of more than one million people, organizations
principally engaged in the processing of personal information and employing more than 200 individuals, or organizations that process sensitive
personal information of more than 100,000 individuals.85 The 2020 Specification establishes new rules for companies that personalize information
based on profiling, including targeted advertising.86 The 2020 Specification provides detailed rules on the obligations of both personal information controllers and the third parties with which they share information.87
These include responsibilities for conducting security assessments of third
parties, monitoring third parties, and disclosing to individuals that a third
party will have access to their information.88 The 2020 Specification also
requires the information controller to take immediate action if it learns
that a third party with which it has shared data has processed information
inappropriately.89
The 2020 Specification adopts aspects of the GDPR model.90 The guidance, for example, requires companies that gather large amounts of personal information to appoint a data protection officer (though the
Chinese specification is not technically binding).91 The guidance also imposes duties on data controllers with respect to third parties with whom
they share information.92
However, distinct differences remain. One of the architects of the 2018
Specification, Yuehong Hong, observes that these rules are “stricter than
the U.S., but not as much as the EU.”93 For example, unlike the European Union, where consent must be explicit, the Chinese interpretation
of consent seems to permit implied consent, at least for non-sensitive personal information.94 An individual’s right to port their data from one online service provider to another, while broad under the GDPR, is limited
by the 2018 Specification only to an individual’s basic information, as well
as health, psychological, education, and work information.95 Yet at certain other points, the Chinese law, at least on its face, can be even more
demanding than the E.U. law.96 For example, the Cybersecurity Law
84. HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 83, at 1–2, 6.
85. “Personal Information Security Regulations” English Version Announced, NAT’L
INFO. SEC. STANDARDIZATION TECH. COMM. (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.tc260.org.cn/
front/postDetail.html?id=20200918200432 [https://perma.cc/9SEP-Z487].
86. HOGAN LOVELLS, supra note 83, at 2.
87. Id. at 5–6.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 82.
94. Id. at 84–85. The proposed amendments to the Standard also make provision for
implied consent. Id.
95. Id. at 101.
96. Id. at 103.

2021]

Achieving Privacy

619

seems to make consent the exclusive basis for information collection, unlike the E.U. law, which allows a variety of bases for collecting personal
information, including a category of “legitimate interests.”97 A draft proposal from the Cyberspace Administration of China would require network operators to inform “the local cyberspace administration when they
collect important data or sensitive personal information”;98 this would enhance the ability to regulate data for security-related goals.
On August 20, 2021, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress adopted the Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (PIPL), the first legislation focused on protecting
personal data in China. The Wall Street Journal declared it “one of the
world’s strictest data-privacy laws,” and many compared the PIPL to the
GDPR.99 The PIPL requires that personal information only be processed
where there is a “clear and reasonable purpose,” that the collection of
personal information be minimized and not excessive, and that processors
ensure the security of personal information. It also requires processors to
carry out risk assessments prior to engaging in certain activities.100 In
some ways, the PIPL is stricter than the GDPR.101 Unlike the GDPR,
businesses cannot rely on “legitimate interests” to collect and process
data. Furthermore, individual consent may be needed in certain circumstances when it would not be required under the GDPR.102 In other aspects, the PIPL is less strict. For example, the PIPL provides an
additional legal basis for processing when that information has already
been lawfully disclosed.103 The PIPL took effect on November 1, 2021.
Security is also a key motivation for other aspects of the data regime.
In comparison to the United States’ all-permissive approach to cross-border data flow and the European Union’s careful control on outward flows
of personal data, China has moved towards more restrictive policies to
keep data within its own borders.104 Certain important entities must store
97. Id. at 83–84; GDPR, supra note 23, art. 6.
98. KEN DAI & JET DENG, DENTONS, 2019 CHINA DATA PROTECTION & CYBERSECURITY ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2020).
99. Eva Xiao, China Passes One of the World’s Strictest Data-Privacy Laws, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 20, 2021, 4:55 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-passes-one-of-the-worldsstrictest-data-privacy-laws-11629429138 [https://perma.cc/7G3U-TK9G].
100. China Passes the Personal Information Protection Law, to Take Effect on November 1, GIBSON DUNN (Sep. 10, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/china-passes-the-personal-information-protection-law-to-take-effect-on-november-1 [https://perma.cc/KL2GE7N7].
101. Catherine Zhu, Is China’s New Personal Information Privacy Law the New
GDPR?, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 17, 2021, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/is-chinas-new-personal-information-privacy-law-the-new-gdpr [https://perma.cc/
K8FY-XU7K].
102. Id.
103. LATHAM & WATKINS, CHINA INTRODUCES FIRST COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION
ON PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION 1, 3 (September 8, 2021), https://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/china-introduces-first-comprehensive-legislation-on-personal-information-protection#:~:text=ON%20August%2020%2C%202021%2C%20the,effect%20on
%20November%201%2C%202021 [https://perma.cc/9KFK-XF6X].
104. Richard D. Taylor, “Data Localization”: The Internet in the Balance, 44
TELECOMM. POL’Y 1, 8 (2020).
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personal information in China unless they pass a Cyberspace Administration of China security assessment. Furthermore, when transferring personal information outside China, the processor must “inform the data
subjects of the transfer, obtain their specific consent to the transfer, and
ensure that the data recipients satisfy standards of personal information
protection similar to those in the PIPL.”105
Chinese practitioners we interviewed suggested that a key cost of compliance was in setting up privacy management systems, including data
mapping. One significant challenge was to change internal corporate culture to prioritize privacy.
III. COSTS OF PRIVATE COMPLIANCE
The costs of complying with privacy law vary dramatically—from the
baker managing a relatively small database of her regular customers’ orders to the 1,000-person company supplying information services to a variety of clients across multiple jurisdictions. In this Part, we summarize a
variety of studies on the costs of compliance with respect to data privacy
law in the European Union and the United States.
The different studies paint vastly different portraits of costs. One study
estimates mean expenditure for privacy compliance to be $1 million in
2018—the year the GDPR first went into effect—and $622,000 in 2019.106
Another study, meanwhile, found an average 2018 budget focused on
GDPR compliance of $13.2 million, rising to $13.6 million in 2019.107 Estimates for compliance with U.S. privacy laws are wide-ranging, but generally significantly lower.
The review below shows that compliance with the GDPR for large
firms is quite expensive. Our survey respondents generally ranked the
E.U. privacy regime to be the costliest of the three frameworks. They
described compliance with the U.S. regime as less expensive, whether for
large or small firms, and compliance with Chinese privacy laws as the
least expensive—though that may be due to a lack of awareness of the
law. Among our respondents, cybersecurity costs appeared to be more
significant with respect to compliance with Chinese and U.S. laws than
compliance with E.U. law. The E.U. compliance costs seem to be significantly skewed towards personnel, both in-house personnel and outside
consultants.
As the wide ranges of the estimates might suggest, the data is inherently limited. There is no consistent framework for analyzing the costs of
105. China Passes the Personal Information Protection Law, to Take Effect on November 1, supra note 100.
106. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., IAPP-EY ANNUAL PRIVACY GOVERNANCE REPORT
2019, at 28 (2019).
107. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE IN THE GDPR RACE: A GLOBAL VIEW OF GDPR
PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, CHINA, AND JAPAN 27 (2019), [hereinafter
PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE] https://mcdermott-will-emery-2793.docs.contently.com/v/
keeping-pace-in-the-gdpr-race-a-global-view-of-gdpr-progress-in-the-united-states-europechina-and-japan [https://perma.cc/Z9N8-QBX7].
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compliance with data privacy laws. Every study seems to adopt its own
methodology. One study, for example, breaks down costs as consisting of
(1) “the costs of granting access to data gathered on each consumer,” (2)
“the costs of providing notice of privacy policies,” (3) “the costs of obtaining individual consent,” (4) “the costs of creating greater transparency,” and (5) “the costs of granting customers choice—including that
of opting out or opting in to the database.”108 Another study meanwhile
identifies the following components of data privacy costs: “data protection and enforcement activities,” “incident response plans,” “compliance
audits and assessments,” “policy development,” “communications &
training,” “staff certification,” “redress activities,” “investments in specialized technologies to protect data assets such as threat intelligence,
managed file transfer, identity and access governance, cyber analytics,
data loss prevention,” and “encryption.”109 Several of the studies are
based on surveys of selected participants, which of course reflect both
who is invited to take them and who actually completes them.110
Furthermore, any study of costs is necessarily incomplete. Privacy law
also affects firms in ways that are difficult to quantify. If a firm decides
not to offer a feature or decides not to enter a jurisdiction because of
privacy law, the opportunity foregone is difficult to value. Data minimization or purpose specification may mean that companies do not gather
data that they did not realize would prove useful for future business.111
At the same time, however, gathering excessive amounts of information
increases the risk of harm from any cybersecurity breach, as well as
reputational risk.112 Little information is available on the costs of restructuring of operations by businesses to bring themselves into compliance.
We conducted a survey among privacy experts to seek to obtain information about the costs of compliance for private enterprises.113 The survey was circulated to privacy professionals both directly and through
online social platforms, and was open for responses from June 18 to Au108. Ravi Sarathy & Christopher J. Robertson, Strategic and Ethical Considerations in
Managing Digital Privacy, 46 J. BUS. ETHICS 111, 120 (2003).
109. PONEMON INST., THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE WITH DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 4 (Dec. 2017), [hereinafter PONEMON INST., THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE]
https://dynamic.globalscape.com/files/Whitepaper-The-True-Cost-of-Compliance-withData-Protection-Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3YF-4433].
110. See id. at 3; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at iv; PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 36.
111. Alan McQuinn & Daniel Castro, The Costs of an Unnecessarily Stringent Federal
Data Privacy Law, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://itif.org/publications/2019/08/05/costs-unnecessarily-stringent-federal-data-privacy-law [https://
perma.cc/X4BV-DC78].
112. Sheryl Falk, Dan Roffman & Steve McNew, Minimizing Privacy Risk with Data
Minimization, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/09/02/
minimizing-privacy-risk-with-data-minimization/?slreturn=20210530031228 [https://
perma.cc/GML6-HAA8].
113. The complete survey and its results are posted online. Anupam Chander, Meaza
Abraham, Sandeep Chandy, Yuan Fang, Dayoung Park & Isabel Yu, Default Report:
World Bank Data Protection Survey (Aug. 3, 2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Cwzne
OtePmmj0kZt7HBF-bxRkVfsORYc/view?usp=sharing [https://perma.cc/6M8U-N2QY].
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gust 3, 2020. Various selection biases in our survey suggest caution relying
on its results, and we do not rely on the survey results for our conclusions
in this paper.
The questionnaire asked privacy professionals to indicate whether they
worked at companies that largely collect data on those companies’ own
behalf or companies that help other organizations manage their data. It
tailored most of the remaining questions based on the answer to that initial query. The questions focused on the costs of compliance with the privacy regimes of the three jurisdictions that are the focus of this study, the
impact of those regimes on decisions by companies, and questions about
cross-border data flows. To help provide consistency of responses, privacy
professionals helping other organizations manage data were requested to
respond on behalf of two hypothetical clients: a small e-commerce firm
with 100,000 user accounts and few overseas accounts, and a large business service provider with 100 million user accounts and operations in
various jurisdictions. We received fifty-one responses to our survey from
persons based in seventeen different countries. The top countries among
our respondents were the United States (43%), India (11%), Germany
(7%), and the United Kingdom (7%). Half of the respondents were consultants that help other organizations manage their data and 36% were
data controllers themselves. The large majority of the respondents (81%)
had no foreign ownership, while 13% of the respondents had less than
50% foreign ownership, and 6.38% of them had 50% or more foreign
ownership. The percentage of respondents having more than 500 full-time
employees was 41%; 17.39% of respondents had more than fifty and
fewer than 500 full-time employees; 19.57% of respondents had more
than ten and fewer than fifty full-time employees; and for 21.74% of respondents, the number of full-time employees was between one and ten.
Both the survey and the survey results are available online.
We also conducted interviews with a dozen leading experts across the
world—in the United States, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
We promised confidentiality with respect to their identities so that they
could advise us freely. We do not rely upon our survey results or interviews as dispositive. The survey results and interviews have informed our
study but largely serve as a check on our conclusions.
We highlight one especially costly component of data privacy because it
is not limited to any one jurisdiction. Data breaches are expensive to respond to and highlight the need for proper cybersecurity to avoid such
breaches. A global study conducted by the Ponemon Institute on behalf
of computer hardware developer IBM analyzed breaches involving the
loss or theft of customer or consumer records from July 2018 to April
2019.114 Expenditures on activities and resources associated with
114. PONEMON INST., COST OF A DATA BREACH 3 (2019), [hereinafter PONEMON INST.,
COST OF A DATA BREACH] https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/RDEQK07R [https://
perma.cc/TDF2-2J5M].
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breaches with lifecycles of more than 200 days were $4.56 million.115 An
average of $0.21 million was expended on resources enabling organizations to notify regulators, such as the GDPR’s Supervisory Authorities,
and to inform affected data subjects of the relevant breach.116 Another
Ponemon Institute survey found that data breaches were widespread
among the companies surveyed: “About half of the respondents had
GDPR data breaches that must be reported to regulators.”117 This was
consistent across the world: “Thirty-nine percent of US respondents, 45%
of European respondents, 36% of Chinese respondents and 33% of Japanese respondents say they reported a personal data breach to a
regulator.”118
A. COMPLIANCE COSTS

FOR

E.U. DATA PROTECTION LAW

1. Overall Costs of GDPR Compliance
As indicated earlier, estimates for average annual GDPR compliance
costs range widely, depending on the size of the company, the nature of
its business, and other factors. For large firms, the estimates are routinely
in the millions of dollars each year.119 A study conducted in 2019 by the
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) in conjunction
with Ernst & Young, a global professional service network, found mean
privacy expenditure for the companies at which its survey respondents
worked to be $1 million in 2018, the year the GDPR first went into effect,
and $622,000 in 2019.120 That study was not restricted to companies complying with the GDPR alone, but surveyed companies across the world,
including many in the United States.121 Research focused on GDPR compliance conducted by the Ponemon Institute in 2019 on behalf of international law firm McDermott Will & Emery LLP (MW&E) found
substantially higher figures: the average 2019 budget for GDPR activities
was $13.6 million, a slight increase from $13.2 million in 2018.122 A high
percentage of the costs (between one-fifth and one-half, depending on
the study) are associated with the hiring of privacy compliance personnel.123 Technology also accounts for a significant portion (between 12%
to 17%, depending on the study) of GDPR privacy expenses.124 Outside
consultants and lawyers accounted for another 18% to 20%, again de115. Id. at 34–35.
116. Id.
117. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 2.
118. Id.
119. See Joseph Johnson, Average Estimated GDPR Costs for FTSE100 Companies in
the United Kingdom (UK) in 2018, by Sector, STATISTA (Nov. 5, 2020), https://
www.statista.com/statistics/869613/gdpr-implementation-cost-by-sector [https://perma.cc/
Q7QS-MF4W].
120. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS, supra note 106, at 28.
121. See id. at 2.
122. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 27.
123. Id. at 28; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 39.
124. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 28; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.,
supra note 106, at 39.
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pending on the study.125 One study concluded that GDPR compliance
required extensive person-hours in meetings; DataGrail estimates that
the average company spent 2,100 hours in GDPR preparation meetings
and that enterprises staffed with 1,000 or more employees could have
spent over 9,000 hours in such meetings.126
The different results suggest great variation in expenditures for compliance, depending on firm size, industry, types of activities, geography, perceived risks of operations, and risk tolerance. For the very large
companies that make up the FTSE 100 stock index, estimates for GDPR
compliance for 2018 range from an average of $84 million for banks, to
$26 million for technology and telecommunications firms, and to $6 million for industrial goods and services firms.127 Notably, despite these expenditures, most respondents (62% in the IAPP/EY study) believed their
privacy budget was insufficient to meet their data protection obligations.128 The cost of data privacy compliance can be quite high—so high
that companies avoid certain jurisdictions entirely or simply ignore the
laws.129 More than half of the E.U. privacy professionals surveyed in the
IAPP/EY study said that their organizations were not “fully” or even
“very” compliant.130
The IAPP/EY study surveyed 370 respondents, predominately composed of organizations headquartered in the United States (39%), the
European Union (33%), and the United Kingdom (13%).131 Company
size ranged from under 100 to over 75,000 employees, and represented
industry sectors included technology, finance, healthcare, government,
and consulting services.132 The salaries and benefits of an organization’s
privacy team constituted the majority of privacy spending, receiving
$397,100 on average; combined technology expenditures followed, receiving an average mean privacy spend of $172,000.133 Privacy expenditures
are higher for organizations with more employees: organizations with
5,000 or fewer employees were estimated to have a mean privacy expenditure of $257,700 in 2019, whereas organizations with 75,000 or more
employees had an estimated mean privacy expenditure of $1,883,200.134
125. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 28; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.,
supra note 106, at 39.
126. DATAGRAIL, THE AGE OF PRIVACY: THE COST OF CONTINUOUS COMPLIANCE 6
(2020), https://datagrail.io/downloads/GDPR-CCPA-cost-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RLU7-RYAT].
127. Johnson, supra note 119. Currency conversion from British pounds using XE.
128. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 37.
129. See Richard Stiennon, Unintended Consequences of the European Union’s GDPR,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardstiennon/2017/11/27/
unintended-consequences-of-the-european-unions-gdpr/?sh=4d9466243c14 [https://
perma.cc/8ZP7-LXM3].
130. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at iv.
131. Id. at viii, 2.
132. Id. at 3–4.
133. Id. at 28.
134. Id. at 30.
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FIGURE 1: MEAN 2019 ESTIMATED PRIVACY SPEND REPORTED
IAPP BY EMPLOYEE SIZE, U.S. DOLLARS135
Category
Privacy Team
Salaries
Privacy Team
Technologies
Outside Privacy
Team
Technologies
Other Privacy
Budget
TOTAL
PRIVACY
SPEND

TO

<5k
5k–24.9k
Employees Employees

25k–74.9k
Employees

75k+
Employees

$170,700

$581,800

$744,200

$847,100

$23,500

$47,100

$39,700

$115,600

$38,700

$30,500

$57,500

$814,200

$24,700

$84,500

$82,000

$106,200

$257,700

$743,800

$923,400

$1,883,200

The Ponemon Institute surveyed 1,263 organizations in 2019 on behalf
of MW&E.136 Respondents hailed from the United States (544), Europe
(371), China (102), and Japan (246).137 Represented organizations ranged
from those with fewer than 500 employees to those with over 75,000 employees, and predominant industries were financial services (18%), industrial (13%), entertainment (11%), and health and pharmaceuticals
(11%).138 The survey found an average GDPR compliance budget of
$13.6 million in fiscal year 2019.139

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 2.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 27.
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FIGURE 2: ANNUAL BUDGETS FOR GDPR COMPLIANCE
DOLLARS140
3%
4%
> $50M
$26M-$50M
12%
$21M-$25M

IN

2019, U.S.

2%
< $500K

8%
$500,001K-$1M
13%
$1M-$5M

15%
$16M-$20M

23%
$6M-$10M
22%
$11M-$15M

2. Components of GDPR Compliance
The studies shed light on the various components of the costs of compliance. Managed services, personnel, and technologies continued to receive the greatest amount of funding, experiencing few to no changes in
allocation since 2018.141

140. Id. at 62.
141. Id. at 28.
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PRIVACY BUDGET, 2018–2019142

Area of Budget
Managed Services
Personnel
Technologies
Consultants
Business Process Engineering
Outside Lawyers
Training
Salary & Travel
Technology & Tools
Outside Counsel
Internal Training
Consulting Services
Professional Development
Gov. Affairs
Other

2019
28%
17%
17%
11%
11%
9%
7%
50%
12%
10%
9%
8%
7%
4%
2%

2018
28%
18%
17%
10%
10%
9%
7%
47%
12%
15%
N/A
8%
9%
3%
4%

The large expenditure in banking may be the result of the high risk
posed by banks’ data processing activities, as a bank data breach runs the
risk of handing over the financial information and resources of data subjects, therefore requiring heavier investments in cybersecurity.143

142. Id.; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106 at 39.
143. Abi Millar, GDPR: How Is It Affecting Banks?, FIN. DIR. (June 21, 2018), https://
www.financialdirector.co.uk/2018/06/21/gdpr-how-is-it-affecting-banks [https://perma.cc/
4SXN-577V].
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FIGURE 4: TOTAL COMPLIANCE COST FOR FTSE 100 COMPANIES,
MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS144
The figures in the table below have been converted from GBP to USD
using XE’s currency converter and were rounded.
Research Entity

Statista, 2018

Ponemon Institute,
2017

Cost of GDPR
Compliance
Banks
$93.8M
Technology & Telecoms $28.5M
Energy & Utilities
$27.3M
Retail
$21.4M
Healthcare
$15.4M
Travel & Leisure
$14.2M
Financial Services
$11.3M
Media
$9.5M
Industrial Goods &
$7.1M
Services
Financial Services
$30.9M
Industrial
$29.4M
Energy & Utilities
$24.8M
Transportation
$24.3M
Technology & Software $23.6M
Healthcare
$19M
Pharmaceuticals
$18.2M
Consumer Products
$17.6M
Communications
$16.7M
Public Sector
$14.5M
Retail
$11.5M
Education & Research
$9.8M
Media
$7.7M

Industry

Salaries for privacy compliance personnel form a major part of privacyrelated expenditures.145 A study by DataGrail surveyed 301 professionals
involved in the GDPR decision-making process at companies with fifty or
more employees in 2019 and found that 67% of companies engaged at
least twenty-five employees when preparing for the GDPR; 44% of companies had at least fifty employees.146 Findings from the IAPP’s survey
144. Johnson, supra note 119; PONEMON INST., THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE, supra
note 109, at 10.
145. See INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 28.
146. DATAGRAIL, supra note 126, at 3.
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showed that privacy staffing, like total privacy spending on GDPR compliance, reportedly leveled off in 2019: only 30% of organizations surveyed in 2019 expected an increase in full-time privacy staff, 66%
expected no changes, and 4% expected a decrease.147 A mean of 7.1 employees work on privacy-related matters full-time while a mean of 15.7 do
so part-time.148
FIGURE 5: STAFF-RELATED PRIVACY EXPENDITURES149
The figures in the table below have been converted from euros to U.S.
dollars using XE’s currency converter and were rounded.
Research Entity
IAPP-EY, 2019
(Respondents: 370 privacy
professionals from the IAPP
database located in
the United States and the
European Union)

Staff Related
Expenditure
Privacy Team
Salaries and
Benefits (2019)
Salary and Travel
(2018)
Salary and Travel
(2019)
Additional Staff
(United
Kingdom)

Paul Hastings, 2017
(Respondents: 100 FTSE 350
firms in the United Kingdom
and 100 Fortune 500 companies
Additional Staff
in the United States)
(United States)

Cost
$397,100 (average)
47% of privacy
budget
50% of privacy
budget
40% of
respondents have
allocated $263,600–
$524,700
34% of
respondents have
allocated $501,000–
$1M

Data from MW&E’s study reported that almost half of the organizations represented (48%) are in the process of hiring or are expecting to
hire an average of almost four additional employees to provide ongoing
assistance with the GDPR.150 Despite the expected increase for some,
38% of organizations in the research group believe their organization
lacks the human resources to fulfill their obligations and sustain GDPR
compliance in 2019.151
147. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 27.
148. Id. at 23.
149. Id. at 28; Fortune and FTSE Firms to Spend Millions Gearing Up for GDPR
Compliance, New Survey Shows, PAUL HASTINGS (Oct. 25, 2017), https://
www.paulhastings.com/news/news-fortune-and-ftse-firms-to-spend-millions-gearing-upfor-gdpr-compliance-new-survey-shows [https://perma.cc/X7SK-T9V5].
150. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 27.
151. Id. at 25.
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FIGURE 6: PRIVACY TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES REPORTED
EY, 2019152
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The GDPR permits individuals to request the data that companies hold
on them, a process that requires an inventory of the data that companies
hold, and may require configuration of their databases.153 According to
DataGrail’s survey findings, 58% of companies had received eleven or
more data subject requests (DSRs) per month since the GDPR’s implementation and the survey’s closing in April 2019, and 28% received 100
or more per month.154 A reported 58% of companies had at least twentysix employees processing a single data subject request in 2018; this can
likely be attributed to the multi-step process of registering the request,
verifying the requester’s identity, and locating the data on multiple systems—an onerous task for organizations, many of which log such information on spreadsheets.155

152. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 42–43.
153. Rita Heimes, Top 10 Operational Responses to the GDPR—Part 1: Data Inventory
and Mapping, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-operational-responses-to-the-gdpr-data-inventory-and-mapping [https://perma.cc/U6ZQFLAR].
154. DATAGRAIL, supra note 126, at 8.
155. See id. at 2, 8.
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FIGURE 7: OPERATIONAL COSTS OF MANAGING DATA SUBJECT
REQUESTS: VOLUME OF DATA SUBJECT REQUESTS
RECEIVED PER MONTH SINCE APRIL 2019156
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FIGURE 8: OPERATIONAL COSTS OF MANAGING DATA SUBJECT
REQUESTS: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN
PROCESSING A SINGLE DATA SUBJECT REQUEST
SINCE APRIL 2019157
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156. Id. at 8.
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The manual handling of data subject requests has placed a strain on
some organizations due to the time and effort involved in servicing the
requests within the required one-month window.158 A data subject request imposes a range of duties: from locating, compiling, and providing a
data subject with all the information an organization has stored on the
subject, free of charge, which is commonly known as “the “right of access,”159 to locating and deleting all the information stored on a data subject, which is known as the “right to be forgotten.”160 The challenges
posed by data subject requests were echoed by the IAPP’s study in which
56% of the 370 surveyed organizations reported “locating unstructured
personal data” as “difficult.”161
The operational costs that data subject requests impose on an organization appear to be related to the organization’s location, business model,
size, and revenue.162 Findings from the IAPP report suggest that the firms
most likely to receive data subject requests have one or more of the following variables: headquarters in Europe; a blended business model in
which both data controlling and processing were present; and an excess of
25,000 employees or revenue exceeding $25 billion.163 IAPP respondents
that received higher levels of data subject requests reported that they experienced less difficulty managing requests than respondents who received fewer data subject requests.164 The IAPP attributes this
relationship to the increased investments many organizations make toward automating the process of locating a data subject’s information
when facing high quantities of requests, thereby decreasing the amount of
time and staff needed to complete the task.165
Though an organization is only required to hire a Data Protection Officer when (1) the processing of personal data is a core business activity,
(2) the activity involves “sensitive” information, or (3) the processing is
performed routinely on a large scale,166 studies suggest many organizations have heeded the GDPR’s encouragement to appoint a Data Protection Officer even when they are not required to do so. An overwhelming
92% of MW&E’s 1,263 respondents167 and three-fourths of the IAPP’s
370 respondents168 appointed Data Protection Officers despite both
surveys including a wide variety of organizations that, per the GDPR criteria, are not required to appoint a Data Protection Officer.169 Most organizations have appointed only one Data Protection Officer, though
158. See id. at 4; GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 12, 15.
159. GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 12, 15.
160. Id. art. 17.
161. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at v.
162. See id. at xiv, xx.
163. Id.
164. Id. at xix, 89.
165. Id. at xix, 95.
166. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 37.
167. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 21, 36.
168. INT’L ASS’N PRIV., supra note 106, at iv.
169. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 3; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.,
supra note 106, at iv, 6.
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18% of organizations have expended resources on appointing multiple.170
A Data Protection Officer’s compensation varies by region and experience: officers were reported to have a global salary range between
$71,000 and $354,000 in 2018.171
MW&E’s 2019 study found that 46% of respondents had hired outside
counsel for GDPR compliance.172 The survey found that 68% of organizations hired outside counsel to conduct data protection impact assessments,173 a time- and labor-intensive procedure performed whenever a
processing activity using new technologies is proposed and required of
organizations engaging in high-risk processing.174 Contacting data protection agencies (56%), overall risk mitigation (54%), establishing a consent
mechanism for processing (49%), and response to a data subject’s “right
to be forgotten” (49%) followed behind as common reasons for enlisting
outside assistance.175 Approximately 34% of respondents sought outside
counsel for assistance with international data transfers.176 The invalidation of the E.U.–U.S. Privacy Shield by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2020, a data transfer mechanism utilized by 60% of IAPP
respondents, will undoubtedly result in further legal expenditures in the
area in 2020.177
FIGURE 9: PERCENT

Research Entity
Ponemon Institute,
2019
IAPP-EY, 2019

BUDGET ALLOCATED FOR OUTSIDE COUNSEL
& CONSULTING SERVICES178

OF

Outside Counsel and/or Consulting
Service

2019 2018

Consultants

11% 10%

Outside Lawyers

9% 9%

Outside Counsel

10% 15%

Consulting Services

8% 8%

Expenditures on third parties hired to process an organization’s personal data have become commonplace, with 90% of the IAPP’s respon170. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at xii.
171. Oliver Smith, The GDPR Racket: Who’s Making Money From this $9bn Business
Shakedown, FORBES (May 2, 2018, 2:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliversmith/
2018/05/02/the-gdpr-racket-whos-making-money-from-this-9bn-business-shakedown/?sh=
3fe8cf7934a2 [https://perma.cc/4NG5-YE38].
172. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 23.
173. Id. at 24.
174. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 35.
175. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 60.
176. Id.
177. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at xix; see also Case C-311/18, Data Prot.
Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
178. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 28; INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.,
supra note 106, at xx.
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dents reporting that their processing was outsourced.179 The GDPR
mandates that personal data should be outsourced to third parties for
processing only when those processors provide sufficient guarantees
through a written contract that processing will occur in accordance with
the GDPR.180 Data controllers remain responsible for noncompliance by
the processors with which they share data.181 The IAPP reports that only
26% of respondents conducted on-site audits to ensure GDPR compliance, with several respondents observing that doing so was labor-intensive and potentially cost-prohibitive.182 An overwhelming majority of
respondents (94%) rely on the assurances in the contract instead, with
57% of respondents supplementing the contact with questionnaires provided to processors to verify GDPR compliance.183
The GDPR does not outline specific technologies that organizations
should use, though the use of encryption and pseudonymization are encouraged and required whenever feasible.184 The IAPP found an average
of $172,000 was spent on technology expenditures.185 Of the 301 privacy
professionals involved in the decision-making process of their respective
organizations, 58% of those surveyed by DataGrail purchased commercial technology solutions in pursuit of GDPR compliance and 57% invested in developing internal technology solutions.186 The MW&E study
produced similar results: from a surveyed pool of 1,263 privacy professionals, 46% respondents invested in new technologies or services in
preparation for GDPR compliance.187

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at iv.
GDPR, supra note 23, art. 28.
Id. art. 82.
INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at xv–xvi.
Id. at xvi.
GDPR, supra note 23, art. 32.
See INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 28.
DATAGRAIL, supra note 126, at 5, 12.
PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 21, 36.
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FIGURE 10: COMPANY SPENDING ON CONSULTING SERVICES AND/OR
TECHNOLOGY IN PREPARATION FOR GDPR COMPLIANCE188
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FIGURE 11: MANUAL VERSUS AUTOMATION: TOOLS AND METHODS
USED BY ORGANIZATIONS FOR GDPR COMPLIANCE189

Tools Used for Data
Inventory and Mapping

Method for Handling
Data Subject Requests

Email, spreadsheets, in-person
communication (manual)
Commercial software tool designed for
data inventory/mapping
System developed internally
Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
technology
GRC software customized in-house for
inventory/mapping
Outsource data inventory/mapping to
external consultants/law firms
Don’t know
Entirely manual
Partially automated
Still being designed
Haven’t yet addressed

188. DATAGRAIL, supra note 126, at 5.
189. INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., supra note 106, at 62, 64.

60%
31%
30%
21%
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8%
4%
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25%
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Of the 1,263 organizations surveyed by MW&E, 31% of respondents
purchased insurance covering cyber risks.190 Of those insured, 43% had
insurance coverage for GDPR fines and penalties.191 Expenditures on
cybersecurity insurance varied by region with 19% of Chinese respondents, 35% of U.S. respondents, 29% of European respondents, and 31%
of Japanese respondents reporting an insurance purchase.192 Data breach
disclosure requirements continue to be a challenge for many organizations; only 18% of MW&E’s respondents said they were confident in
their ability to notify a data protection authority within seventy-two
hours of becoming aware of the incident, as required by the GDPR.193
The study suggests that many organizations will need to spend additional
funds on external cybersecurity services that would enable them to identify cyberattacks early on and to provide data protection authorities the
necessary forensic evidence within the mandated window of time.194
The GDPR permits regulators to fine organizations up to =
C 20 million
or 4% of an organization’s global annual turnover, whichever is higher, in
cases of noncompliance with the GDPR.195 For the largest companies,
this could result in fines in the millions or even billions of dollars.196
When a personal data breach occurs, an organization must provide notification describing, at minimum, (1) the nature of the breach, (2) its potential consequences, and (3) the measures the organization proposes to
mitigate any harm.197 As of August 5, 2021, there have been approximately 735 instances where fines have been imposed on organizations
under the GDPR.198
B. COMPLIANCE COSTS

FOR

U.S. PRIVACY LAW

Because of the sectoral nature of U.S. privacy law, we examined studies
detailing the costs of compliance with respect to specific industries, particularly health and finance.
1. HIPAA Compliance Costs
Studies over the last two decades have estimated that the health industry as a whole spends billions of dollars on HIPAA compliance initiatives.
In 1999 and 2000, healthcare consulting companies estimated the cost for
190. PONEMON INST., KEEPING PACE, supra note 107, at 52.
191. Id. at 53.
192. Id. at 35–36.
193. Id. at 10.
194. See id.
195. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 83.
196. Stiennon, supra note 129.
197. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 33. No such notification is required if the data breach is
unlikely to present a risk to the rights and liberties of data subjects or notification within
seventy-two hours is rendered unfeasible by circumstance. Id.
198. Fines Statistics, CMS, https://www.enforcementtracker.com/?insights [https://
perma.cc/F67L-JSVR].
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compliance to total from $25 billion to $43 billion in the first five years.199
DHHS, however, estimated that industry-wide implementation would
cost $3.2 billion in HIPAA’s first year and $17.6 billion for the first ten
years.200 In 2003, the research firm Gartner Group estimated that the
healthcare industry would spend between $3.8 billion and $38 billion in
pursuit of HIPAA compliance from 2003 to 2008.201
For individual healthcare providers, the cost could total millions of dollars over time. In 2002, Baylor University Medical Center budgeted $7.5
million over the course of five years to account for HIPAA implementation.202 Texas Health Resources trained 22,000 workers before an April
14, 2003 deadline and expected to spend more than $10 million to comply
with the law.203 Peter Swire, then Chief Privacy Counsel for the Clinton
Administration, projected that HIPAA’s Privacy Rule would cost “$6.25
per year for every insured American.”204
FIGURE 12: COST

OF

HIPAA COMPLIANCE

FOR THE

Research Entity

Affected Respondents

Healthcare Consulting
Companies (2003)

Healthcare providers
(covered entities)

DHHS (2002)

Healthcare providers
(covered entities)

Gartner Group (2003)

Entire healthcare
industry

INDUSTRY205

Estimated Cost of
Compliance
$25–$43 billion
(first 5 years)
$3.2 billion
(first year)
$17.6 billion
(first 10 years)
$3.8–$38 billion
(2003-2008)

In 2011, after certain HIPAA modifications, the DHHS conducted a
study to estimate the additional cost of compliance imposed by the modifications.206 DHHS surveyed “covered entities,” which include all health
plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers.207 DHHS estimated the additional costs incurred to be between $114 million and
$225.4 million in the first year of implementation and approximately
199. Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy
Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 132 & n.239 (2002).
200. Id. at 132.
201. KEVIN BEAVER & REBECCA HEROLD, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HIPAA PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE 23 (2004).
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 199, at 132–33; REBECCA HEROLD & KEVIN
BEAVER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HIPAA PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE 46
(2014).
206. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
207. Id. at 5567.
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$14.5 million annually thereafter.208 These costs include: (1) costs to
HIPAA covered entities to revise and distribute updated notices of privacy practices; (2) costs to HIPAA covered entities to comply with the
requirements of breach notification; (3) costs to business associates to ensure their subcontracts are complying with business associate agreement
requirements; and (4) costs to business associates to fully comply with
HIPAA’s Security Rule.209
The tables that follow break down the estimated costs that covered entities and their business associates expend per year to comply with
HIPAA’s modified provisions.
FIGURE 13: ESTIMATED COSTS

Legislation

FOR

HIPAA COMPLIANCE210

Cost of
Cost of
Estimating
Compliance Compliance
Entity
(USD/year) Components
Notices of
$55.9
Privacy
million
Practices
Breach
$14.5
Notification
million
Requirements

Modifications
to the HIPAA
DHHS
Privacy,
(2013)
Security,
Enforcement,
and Breach
Notification
Rules

Total
Costs

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 5567, 5676.

Affected
Respondents

700,000
covered
entities
19,000
covered
entities
250,000–
500,000
Business
business
$21–$42
Associate
associates of
million
Agreements
covered
entities
200,000–
Security Rule 400,000
$22.6–$113 Compliance by business
associates of
Business
million
covered
Associates
entities
$114–$225.4 million (first year)
$14.5 million (annually after)
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FIGURE 14: ANNUAL COMPLIANCE COSTS
PRACTICES211

FOR

639
NOTICE

OF

PRIVACY

Cost of
Compliance
Components
Drafting
$20 million
privacy notices
698,238 covered entities
(providers, health insurers
Printing privacy
HIPAA
$22.4 million
and third-party
notices
administrators)
Mailing privacy
$13.5 million
notices
Total Costs
$55.9 million/year
Legislation Affected Respondents

Cost of
Compliance
(USD/year)

FIGURE 15: ANNUAL COMPLIANCE COSTS
NOTIFICATION212
Total Cost of
Compliance
(USD/year) for
698,238 Covered
Entities
$3,467,122
$571,200
$1,816,379
$2,052,665
$15,420
$15,420
$5,277,456
$837,500
$422,438
Total Costs

211. Id. at 5676.
212. Id. at 5671.

FOR

BREACH

Cost of Compliance Components

E-mail and First Class Mail, which includes the
cost to compose and document notice, the
hours and cost to prepare mailing, and the cost
of necessary postage and supplies
Substitute Notices: Media Notice
Substitute Notices: Toll-free Number, which
includes monthly and direct charges to the line,
labor costs, and costs to individuals
Imputed cost to affected individuals who call
the toll-free line
Notice to Media of Breach: Over 500
Report to the Secretary: 500 or More
Investigation Costs: Under 500
Investigation Costs: 500 or More
Annual Report to the Secretary: Under 500
$14,475,600/year
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2. GLBA Compliance Costs
Robert Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar’s 2002 study detailed the industry-wide cost of compliance with the GLBA.213 The study found that
banking, insurance, and securities companies altogether may spend
around $2–$5 billion on printing costs alone to comply with the regulation’s privacy policy notifications.214 In 2016, nearly fifteen years after
Hahn and Farrar’s study, amendments to the GLBA created exceptions
to the annual privacy notice requirements.215 The Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection calculated that the modified privacy notice procedures decreased costs by $3 million per institution.216

213. See generally Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 199.
214. Id. at 145.
215. Amendment to the Annual Privacy Notice Requirement Under the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 40945, 40945 (Aug. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R pt. 1016).
216. Id. at 40956.
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FIGURE 16: ESTIMATED COST OF GLBA COMPLIANCE BEFORE
AFTER AMENDMENTS217
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217. Id.; Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 199, at 145; Fred H. Cate, Professor of Law,
Indiana University School of Law, The Privacy Paradox, Prepared Statement at 76th
Annual Winter Newspaper Institute, Address Before North Carolina Press Association
(Jan. 26, 2001) (“Approximately 40,000 financial institutions will be sending as many as 2.5
billion notices to their various customers by June 12, 2001” to comply with the GLBA.).
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3. COPPA Compliance Costs
Compliance with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule
(COPPA) appears to be less costly than those associated with HIPAA or
GLBA. In 2000, the House of Representative’s Committee on Commerce
estimated that the cost of compliance with COPPA ranged from $115,000
to $290,000 per year for a mid-sized children’s website, depending on the
nature of the site.218 The House Committee broke down the costs as indicated in the table below.219 Both the compliance activities and the actual
compliance costs are likely to be significantly different than those estimated by Congress two decades ago.
FIGURE 17: BREAKDOWN

OF

ESTIMATED COPAA COMPLIANCE COSTS
IN 2000220

COPPA Compliance Activities
Legal (audits, construction of private
practices, and policy)
Engineering costs to make the site compliant
Professional chat moderators (price differs
depending on training, hours of operation,
and organization)
Personnel overseeing offline consent,
responding to parents’ questions, reviewing
phone consents, and reviewing permission
forms
Personnel overseeing compliance, database
security, responding to verification and access
requests

Cost
$10,000–$15,000 (one
time)
$35,000 (one time)
$2,500–$10,000 per
month
$35,000–$60,000 per one
person per year in
charge of these activities
$35,000–$60,000 per one
person per year in
charge of these activities

Instead of complying with the legislation, some companies have sought
to avoid COPPA altogether by excluding children under thirteen from
their consumer base.221
218. Recent Developments in Privacy Protections for Consumers: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the Comm. on Com., 106th Cong.
83 (2000) [hereinafter Recent Developments in Privacy Protections for Consumers] (statement of Parry Aftab, Special Counsel, Darby & Darby, P.C.).
219. See id. In 2013, definitions of terms such as “personal information” and “operator”
were expanded and the requirements for notice, parental consent, confidentiality, security,
and data retention and deletion were updated. According to an estimate by the FTC, existing businesses could spend more than $6,200 per year to comply with the new rules,
while new companies could face up to $18,670 per year. Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP,
Have COPPA Changes Resulted in Less Content, Higher Costs? LEXOLOGY (Jul. 26 2013),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0b6d68a9-5d17-4d52-9b30-54d356ddb08a
[https://perma.cc/6549-HCY4].
220. Recent Developments in Privacy Protections for Consumers, supra note 218, at 83
(statement of Parry Aftab, Special Counsel, Darby & Darby, P.C.).
221. See Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, supra note 219.
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CHINA

We were unable to locate studies on the costs of private sector compliance with China’s data privacy regime. Discussions with Chinese privacy
law experts suggest that costs are high due to numerous privacy guidelines or rules, uncertainties regarding the obligations, and possible requirements for data localization.
In an experiment conducted by Tianshu Sun and his colleagues on
Alibaba’s platform in China, researchers found that when algorithmic
recommendations were prohibited by privacy law (because they often
rely on customer profiles), customer engagement and actual marketplace
transactions significantly decreased.222 Though the study focused on a
Chinese platform, the findings imply one type of cost precipitated by privacy laws.
Civil and criminal sanctions, as well as administrative penalties, are
available as consequences for violations of cybersecurity laws.223 Remedies can include “warnings, orders to rectify, fines, . . . compensation to
victims,” and even prison sentences.224 While the GDPR permits fines up
to 2% of a company’s global annual revenue225—an amount that can be
in the billions of dollars for large companies—the fines available under
Chinese law are relatively low and allow a maximum fine of approximately RMB 1,000,000 (about $141,000).226 Authorities may seek sanctions against responsible personnel and revoke their licenses to operate,
resulting in the shutdown of an app or website entirely—a remedy even
more serious than financial penalties.227
Over the last two years, Chinese authorities have acted against websites and apps that violated the nation’s data protection laws. Authorities
have sought to audit the collection and use of personal information by
mobile apps, evaluating more than one thousand apps for data practices
and requiring subsequent changes from many of them.228 In 2018 and
2019, the Cyberspace Administration of China conducted an enforcement
action against mobile apps to target pornography, gambling, malicious
programs, and other disfavored content, and reportedly shut down
222. Tianshu Sun, Zhe Yuan, Chunxiao Li, Kaifu Zhang & Jun Xu, The Value of Personal Data in Internet Commerce: A High-Stake Field Experiment on Data Regulation Policy (Univ. S. Cal., Working Paper No. 3566758, 2020), https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566758 [https://perma.cc/L6G5-RAAM].
223. DLA PIPER, DATA PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD 163 (2021), https://
www.dlapiperdataprotection.com [https://perma.cc/JT7P-4D7R].
224. Id.
225. What Are the GDPR Fines?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/fines [https://perma.cc/
Q6PA-PD3Y].
226. Gil Zhang & Kate Yin, A Look at China’s Draft of Personal Information Protection Law, IAPP (Oct. 26, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/a-look-at-chinas-draft-of-personaldata-protection-law [https://perma.cc/PHK4-SD6G].
227. See Jenny (Jia) Sheng, Chunbin Xu & Esther Tao, China Adopts New Data Security Law, PILLSBURY (July 9, 2021), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/
china-adopts-new-data-security-law.html [https://perma.cc/SRC2-TYR9].
228. DAI & DENG, supra note 98, at 15.
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around 33,638 apps that were found to possess illicit content.229
While data protection practices have garnered increased attention,
much of the enforcement related to the digital economy thus far seems
targeted at issues of public order. Regulating data protection practices
through audits may be construed as part of a broader effort to ensure
control of information circulated online and thus as part of a national
security effort.230
In 2019, China’s National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee proposed revisions to the 2018 Specification, calling for
companies to appoint a person or office to oversee data collection if the
company either (1) employs more than two hundred people to process
personal data or (2) processes data for more than one million people over
the span of twelve months.231 Nevertheless, prior to the implementation
of this requirement, the private sector’s costs of compliance with the
Cybersecurity Law were commonly defined by litigation costs.232 For instance, tech companies such as WeChat, ByteDance, and Tencent have
initiated civil disputes against their competitors in court, aiming to prevent access to protected information.233 In the past few years, ordinary
citizens have increasingly taken advantage of this system to fight tech
companies in pursuit of their own privacy rights.234 Private costs of compliance can also be inferred from the Cybersecurity Law penalty system.
When companies fail to comply with the 2017 Cybersecurity Law,
they are subject to fines from 100,000 to 1,000,000 RMB ($14,351–
$143,517).235
Like the GDPR, the Cybersecurity Law applies to businesses and organizations in all industries; however, several sectors in the private sector
have additional requirements regarding data protection and privacy.236
Within the life sciences industry, China focuses most of its regulation efforts on localizing healthcare data and scientific research through legislation such as the Measures for the Management of Scientific Data and the
Measures for the Management of Population Health Information.237
The People’s Bank of China led regulatory efforts within the financial
industry when it published the Implementation Measures for Protecting
Financial Consumers’ Rights and Interests in December 2019 and effectuated the Personal Financial Information Protection Technical Specifica229. Id. at 16.
230. See generally Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010).
231. Gil Zhang & Kate Yin, More Updates on the Chinese Data Protection Regime in
2019, IAPP (Feb. 26, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/more-positive-progress-on-chinesedata-protection-regime-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/8FQU-6X3H].
232. DAI & DENG, supra note 98, at 20.
233. Id. at 3, 20–21.
234. Id. at 20–21.
235. KPMG CHINA, WANGLU ANQUANFA GAILAN (
) 6 (2017), https://
assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/cn/pdf/zh/2017/02/overview-of-cybersecurity-law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GRH-ZCKF].
236. See DAI & DENG, supra note 98, at 23.
237. Id. at 24–25.
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tion in February 2020.238 The government published the National
Standards on Information Security Technology in March 2020, which
came into force in October 2020.239 Because these regulations focus on
protecting consumer financial information,240 companies in the financial
industry are encouraged to encrypt data and implement adequate access
controls, and they must justify the purpose, method, and scope of their
data collection.241
The Information Security Technology Personal Information Security
Specification governs the e-commerce industry and includes regulations
on how companies may store personal data and obtain consent from customers.242 Online retail stores are advised to require clear and affirmative
consent from customers when collecting personal information, anonymize
personal data, have clearly written contracts with suppliers, and maintain
a data breach response plan.243
IV. COSTS OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
How much does it cost to enforce privacy regulations? We examine this
question by analyzing the budgets of the agencies tasked with enforcing
data privacy laws in Europe, the United States, and China.
This section aims to identify the financial and employee resources
available to regulators and compare them to the enforcement actions undertaken by the regulators. Both E.U. and U.S. agencies publish this information annually. While China has actively enforced data security and
privacy rules in the last two years, we could not locate information on the
budgets for the various Chinese regulators engaged with data privacy
enforcement.
China’s data protection regime is the newest of the three major global
privacy regimes.244 Unlike the GDPR and U.S. regulations, the Chinese
data protection regime does not have a single regulator; instead, the
Cyberspace Administration of China seems to be the primary regulator,
and agencies like the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, and the Ministry of Science and Technology are also vested with
significant regulatory and enforcement roles.245 Budgets for data protection enforcement were not readily available, so we limit our discussion to
describing enforcement activities.
238. Chan, Yue & Ke, supra note 82.
239. Id.
240. DAI & DENG, supra note 98, at 27.
241. Id. at 27.
242. Id. at 28–29.
243. Id. at 29–30.
244. See Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 82.
245. Id. at 90; New Chinese Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Requirements, JONES DAY
(Dec. 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/12/new-chinese-cybersecurity-anddata-privacy-requirements [https://perma.cc/HT9P-DNGX].

646

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Because this is a fast-changing area, any snapshot will not capture the
full dynamics at play. Our review has made it clear that budgets for enforcement have not kept up with the regulations or the scope of the digital economy. While the GDPR builds upon an earlier privacy regime, all
of the privacy regimes in these three jurisdictions have undergone dramatic changes in the last two years. Indeed, the CCPA just went into effect this year and has yet to see its first enforcement action.
While the United States lacks dedicated privacy agencies like those
present in European countries, the FTC has levied significantly higher
fines than E.U. data protection authorities.246 Since May 2018, when the
GDPR came into force, through the beginning of 2021, the FTC imposed
$5.8 billion in total fines, while the European data protection authorities
levied a total of $326 million.247 That seems likely to change, as European
authorities plan large fines for many American firms.248
A. ENFORCEMENT

IN THE

EUROPEAN UNION

1. Overview
On average, the E.U. member states allocated =
C 7 million to each of
their data protection authorities in 2021.249 At the high end, Germany
allocated =
C 94.7 million among both its federal and state data protection
authorities, while Cyprus, Malta, and Estonia, allocated just =
C 0.7 million,
=
C 0.6 million, and =
C 0.8 million, respectively, for the latest year availaC 301 milble.250 Collectively, in 2021, the E.U. member states expended =
lion to enforce data privacy rules governing some 513 million people—
less than a euro (or a dollar) per person for the year.251
The GDPR requires each member state to establish Data Protection
Authorities (DPAs) with sufficient financial resources for their operations.252 In addition to enforcing the GDPR, the DPAs raise awareness,
246. Mark Scott, Digital Competition—Big Tech Down Under—Section 230’s Dirty Secret, POLITICO: DIGITAL BRIDGE (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digitalbridge/politico-digital-bridge-digital-competition-big-tech-down-under-section-230s-dirtysecret [https://perma.cc/9YXR-63WG].
247. Id.
248. See Ryan Browne, Europe’s Privacy Overhaul Has Led to $126 Million in Fines—
But Regulators Are Just Getting Started, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/01/19/eu-gdpr-privacy-law-led-to-over-100-million-in-fines.html
[https://perma.cc/Z6LM-JERZ].
249. See Overview on Resources Made Available by Member States to the Data Protection Authorities and on Enforcement Actions by the Data Protection Authorities, EUR.
DATA PROT. BD. (Aug. 2021) [hereinafter Overview on Resources], https://edpb.europa.eu/
system/files/2021-08/edpb_report_2021_overviewsaressourcesandenforcement_v3_en_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y8AV-PW2A].
250. See id.; JOHNNY RYAN & ALAN TONER, BRAVE, EUROPE’S GOVERNMENTS ARE
FAILING THE GDPR 6 (2020), https://brave.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Brave-2020DPA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HB2-99K4] (vacancies included in count and full-time
equivalents are rounded; data on Austria’s tech specialists is unavailable).
251. See RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 6.
252. GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 51–52.
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provide guidance, handle complaints, and conduct investigations.253 The
GDPR also imposes a duty of cooperation on member states.254 The
GDPR hoped to create a full service enforcement mechanism, charging
the supervisory authority of the “main establishment” of the controller or
processor as the “lead supervisory authority” for the cross-border
processing activities of that controller or processor.255 Secondary “concerned authorities” may also assist in the investigation.256
Budgets allocated to DPAs are generally increasing, although at significantly lower rates than the one-time jump observed between 2017 and
2018, the latter being the year when the GDPR went into effect.257
Twenty-one out of the thirty DPAs surveyed by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB)258 reported dissatisfaction with their level of
resourcing.259 This dissatisfaction stems from a combination of the following: (1) significant increases in data privacy complaints, especially those
that implicate big tech firms or carry cross-border components; (2) the
complex system in which cross-border complaints are handled; and (3)
insufficient resources to match complaint growth.260
2. National Enforcement
Most European governments spend less than one euro per citizen per
year on their data protection authority.261 Many supervisory authorities
complain of insufficient funding.262 Despite such complaints, most DPAs
expect budgets to remain static in the upcoming year.263 In response to
these trends, the European Parliament has called for infringement proceedings against member states accused of breaching article 52 of the
GDPR by failing to provide a budget that fosters effective
performance.264

253. DELOITTE, REPORT ON EU DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES, PART 5: GUIDANCE
ISSUED 2 (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/se/Documents/risk/riskreports-privacy-and-data-protection-guidance-issued.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JL8-U8HJ].
254. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 31.
255. See id. art. 56.
256. Id. art. 4(22).
257. See RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 6.
258. Under the GDPR, the European Data Protection Board is the working group
made up of representatives from each E.U. member state’s national DPA.
259. ACCESS NOW, TWO YEARS UNDER THE EU GDPR: AN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REPORT 9 (2020), https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2020/05/TwoYears-Under-GDPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQJ3-SQUD].
260. See id. at 9, 13.
261. See RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 6.
262. ACCESS NOW, supra note 259, at 9.
263. Id. at 10.
264. EUR. PARL. DOC. B9-0211/2021 ¶ 17 (2021).
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Using online forms and supplementary guidance procedures, data subjects and related organizations submit complaints to the DPAs, while data
processors and controllers submit data breach notifications. 266 Cases
with cross-border components can be received through a DPA’s website
or through the Internal Market Information System (IMI), which operates as a communication tool for all E.U. member states.267 Through IMI,
DPAs can coordinate with the authorities of other concerned or lead
member states by utilizing a series of pre-translated question-and-answer
forms, while also tracking the case’s development.268 Complaints may
also be lodged by the DPA itself pursuant to the investigative and super265. See Overview on Resources, supra note 249, at 4. Slightly different budget figures
are reported in DELOITTE, REPORT ON EU DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES PART 4:
RESOURCES (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/risk/de
loitte-nl-risk-reports-resources.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D7B-GX34].
266. GDPR, supra note 23, art. 33; Complaints, EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, https://
edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-role-supervisor/complaints_en [https://perma.cc/
JM2Y-JPEX].
267. See generally Internal Market Information System, EUR. COMM’N, https://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/AM4V-Y92D]; Our
Members, EUR. DATA PROT. BD., https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/about-edpb/members_en [https://perma.cc/96HD-34V4].
268. See Single Market Scoreboard, EUR. COMM’N (2020), https://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/scoreboard [https://perma.cc/M3PR-RZ4U].
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visory powers granted by the GDPR.269
The second and third year of GDPR implementation have seen a dramatic increase in the quantity of complaints received by member states.
Since May 25, 2018, the German enforcement authorities alone received
66,965 and the French authorities received 41,601 complaints.270 Each
complaint requires processing by DPA employees and, if appropriate, an
investigation to determine the complaint’s validity.271 As awareness of
data protection rights increases through media reports and DPA-sponsored podcasts and social media accounts, several member states have
turned to helpdesk services and online live chats to respond to the influx
of complaints received by overworked complaint handlers.272 These approaches seek to offer early-stage assessments of data privacy queries by
answering questions and suggesting when potential complaints should be
lodged.273
In 2019 and 2020, respectively, Ireland’s Department of Information
and Assessment received 48,500 and 35,200 contacts related to data privacy: 22,300 and 23,200 emails, 22,200 and 10,000 phone calls, as well as
4,000 and 2,000 letters through post.274 Ireland relies on the early-stage
assessment tool as their DPA reportedly receives 150 and 144 new complaints every week in 2019 and 2020, respectively—with a growing number of data subjects finding “novel ways” to apply the GDPR, according
to Data Protection Commissioner Helen Dixon.275

269. See generally GDPR, supra note 23, art. 58.
270. See Overview on Resources, supra note 249, at 10.
271. See Complaints Handling—Data Protection Notice, EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-role-supervisor/complaints-handling-dataprotection-notice_en [https://perma.cc/D4A5-H6YC].
272. See INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., GDPR: ONE YEAR ON 4–6 (May 30, 2019), https://
ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2614992/gdpr-one-year-on-20190530.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/NQ8L-UCG8].
273. See DATA PROT. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 14–16 (2020) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT (2020)], https://www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2021-05/DPC
%202020%20Annual%20Report%20%28English%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA3EELLU].
274. Id. at 15; DATA PROT. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2019) [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT (2019)], https://www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2020-04/DPC
%20Annual%20Report%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVE3-6BX4].
275. Simon Carswell, Big Tech ‘Procedural Queries’ Delay Decision on First Data
Fines—Watchdog, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/big-tech-procedural-queries-delay-decision-on-first-data-fines-watchdog1.4178751 [https://perma.cc/35FK-W6KX].
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Despite the large volume of complaints submitted, the number of fines
issued in the first three years of the GDPR’s operation has remained low.
By October 8, 2021, E.U. nations (including the United Kingdom) had
issued 809 fines under the GDPR, totaling over one billion euros. 277
Spain takes the quantitative lead, having imposed 301 fines to date since
the GDPR’s inception;278 the Spanish DPA has received 18,480 complaints and 1,434 reports of data breaches since May 25, 2018.279 Germany—despite having the largest DPA in terms of both budget and
staff—has imposed just thirty-three fines, as of October 8, 2021.280 Numerous supervisory authorities have attributed the disparity between the
number of complaints received and fines issued to a lack of resources.281
Supervisory authorities have reported that the cooperation mechanism
in which cross-border cases are compelled to operate creates significantly
276.
277.
278.
279.

See Overview on Resources, supra note 249, at 10, 15.
Fines Statistics, supra note 198.
Id.
EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE 97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE SPANISH SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 12 (2020) [hereinafter ANSWERS
FROM SPAIN], https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/es_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9TLH-Y4XP].
280. Fines Statistics, supra note 198.
281. See id.; Individual Replies from the Data Protection Supervisory Authorities, supra
note 276.
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longer investigations and decision-making proceedings.282 Compulsory
measures such as the exchange of relevant information and case development notifications often proceed at a slow pace.283 Although IMI provides pre-translated forms for early stages of the complaint process, the
system cannot translate documents and other correspondence relevant to
the investigation and decision-making proceedings.284 As a result, expenditures on independent translation services are sometimes required.285 The supervisory authorities of Bulgaria and Germany have
noted that these translations have a considerable effect on the duration
and cost of investigations, especially when cases require coordination
across multiple member states.286
The novel and complex legal issues presented during GDPR investigations and proceedings require substantial expenditures on legal counsel.287 When overseeing cross-border cases, the DPA must take into
account the citizenship of the impacted data subject to ensure compliance
with the national procedural rules of the member state.288 Italy’s DPA
reported that the additional legal research and dialogue required between
member states during cross-border proceedings has lengthened proceedings and delayed sanctions.289 Germany, with a reported budget of
=
C 94,793,900 (more than double that of Italy’s), has voiced similar complaints as its federal and state DPAs face a backlog totaling 19,752 cases,
some extending as far back as 2017.290
282. Press Release, Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Data Protection as Fundamental Right—Big Demand, Long Delivery Time (Feb.
13, 2020), https://datenschutz-hamburg.de/assets/pdf/2020-02-13_press-release_annual_report_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHG5-QGDX].
283. See, e.g., ANSWERS FROM SPAIN, supra note 279, at 10.
284. See, e.g., EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE
97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE FRENCH SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 7 (2020), https://
edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fr_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TY8E-5Q8V].
285. See, e.g., id.
286. EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE 97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD: ANBULGARIAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 5 (2020), https://
SWERS
FROM
THE
edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/bg_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L3QC-4U6L]; EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE 97—
QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD:
ANSWERS FROM THE GERMAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 16 (2020) [hereinafter ANSWERS
FROM
GERMANY], https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/de_sas_gdpr_art_
97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ54-FAWU].
287. See, e.g., ACCESS NOW, supra note 259 at 3 (“Fear of legal costs and delay tactics
have sharply limited the capacity of DPAs to move forward key cases against tech giants
whose revenues are sometimes higher than the DPAs’ budgets.”).
288. See ANNUAL REPORT (2019), supra note 274 at 9, 90.
289. EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE 97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE ITALIAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 3 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/it_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/V356-7M92].
290. See Overview on Resources, supra note 249, at 11. The backlog of cases does not
include the values of all DE authorities.
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Individual cases can prove extremely costly for regulators. A single investigation into Cambridge Analytica carried out by the U.K data protection authority cost £2.4 million (about $3.1 million) and took more than
three years.291 The investigation required the DPA to review forty-two
laptops and computers, 700 terabytes of data, thirty-one servers, over
300,000 documents, and a wide range of material in paper form and from
cloud storage devices.292 After the Austrian activist Max Schrems successfully obtained a decision from the Court of Justice of the European
Union concerning cross-border data transfers to the United States,293 Ireland was ordered to pay his legal costs—a bill estimated to exceed =
C2
294
million.
On average, each of the eleven lawyers in the Austrian data protection
authority simultaneously manages over one hundred cross-border and national cases.295 With many DPA budgets failing to provide the legal resources necessary to efficiently resolve cross-border complaints, member
states like Malta have expressed the need to prioritize national complaints and limit their role in matters of regional concern.296
Procedural queries by the legal teams of investigated data controllers
further delay the decision-making process.297 The DPAs oversee the regulation of data processors with revenues that are grossly larger than their
C 5 million
budget.298 A notable example is Luxembourg, which allocates =
for data protection enforcement—to include enforcing data protection
against companies such as Amazon.299 But despite its small size, the DPA
recently issued a $887 million fine against Amazon, which the company is

291. Izabella Kaminska, Opinion, ICO’s Final Report into Cambridge Analytica Invites
Regulatory Questions, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/10/06/
1602008755000/ICO-s-final-report-into-Cambridge-Analytica-invites-regulatory-questions
[https://perma.cc/XLJ6-E7QP].
292. Natasha Lomas, Cambridge Analytica Sought to Use Facebook Data to Predict Partisanship for Voter Targeting, UK Investigation Confirms, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/06/cambridge-analytica-sought-to-use-facebook-data-topredict-partisanship-for-voter-targeting-uk-investigation-confirms [https://perma.cc/C5KV95GG].
293. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II),
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 343 (July 16, 2020).
294. Cianan Brennan, Data Protection Commission Hit with Massive Legal Bill After
Facebook Privacy Case, IRISH EXAM’R (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.irishexaminer.com/
news/arid-40073378.html [https://perma.cc/5645-WY3W].
295. EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE 97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE AUSTRIAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 6 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/at_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/WV9R-EG27].
296. EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE 97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE MALTESE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 5 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/mt_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU66-X28Y].
297. ACCESS NOW, supra note 259, at 10.
298. See id.
299. Id.
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currently challenging.300
The GDPR also creates a private right of action for material or nonmaterial damage suffered from a breach of data privacy laws.301 Pursuant
to article 78, a data subject may seek a judicial remedy before the courts
of the supervisory authority’s member state.302 A data subject can also
file suit against competent supervisory authorities that (1) fail to conduct
an investigation where a valid complaint exists or (2) fail to notify data
subjects of developments related to the case within three months of
processing.303 Data subjects may seek recourse independently or through
representation via an organization, so long as that organization’s statutory objectives are aligned with the public interest and demonstrate an
active presence in data rights.304 Although at present no data subjects or
organizations have invoked article 78 against a supervisory authority, the
pressure additional legal proceedings would place on an already strained
legal staff with a small budget is a matter of growing concern.305
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According to one report, only six DPAs have more than ten technology
specialists on staff contributing to investigations, while half of Europe’s
300. Richard Lawler, Amazon Fined Record $887 Million over EU Privacy Violations,
VERGE (July 30, 2021, 9:07 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/7/30/22601661/amazongdpr-fine-cnpd-marketplace-antitrust-data [https://perma.cc/T8RT-984V].
301. See GDPR, supra note 23, art. 78.
302. Id.
303. Id. arts. 77, 78(2).
304. Id. art. 80(1).
305. See Fines Statistics, supra note 198; RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 1.
306. RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 3–5, 7–8. The vacancies are included in the
count and full-time equivalents are rounded. Data on Austria’s tech specialists is
unavailable.
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DPAs employ five or fewer technology specialists.307 Supervisory authorities like Belgium and the Czech Republic have reported that a shortage
in tech investigators has limited their investigative abilities, making the
collection and conservation of digital proof related to GDPR violations
difficult.308 Although Germany contributes 29% of Europe’s technology
specialists, the country has received similar complaints from state-level
DPAs.309 The recruitment and retainment of tech specialists has also
proven challenging, particularly in DPAs with restrictive budgets.310
Fourteen of these DPAs have annual budgets under =
C 5 million, making it
more difficult to ensure sufficient personnel to examine data practices.311
The United Kingdom’s ICO has undertaken efforts to mitigate the risk
of uncompetitive pay by reviewing pay arrangements against the private
sector and establishing apprenticeships to attract budding specialists.312
B. ENFORCEMENT

IN THE

UNITED STATES

The United States does not have a single data privacy authority; rather,
various federal privacy laws are enforced by different agencies. In the
health sector, HIPAA is enforced principally by the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) of DHHS.313 In the financial sector, the GLBA is enforced
by several banking regulators, as well as the FTC.314 Each of these regulators is funded separately by the U.S. federal government. The FTC also
serves as a de facto privacy regulator under its responsibility to regulate
unfair and deceptive practices.315
The following sections provide an overview of the U.S. data protection
regulations at federal and state levels. They focus on the enforcement of
307. Id. at 7.
308. See id. at 3; EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE
97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE BELGIAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 3 (2020), https://
edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/be_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YWR9-UX54]; EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EVALUATION OF THE GDPR UNDER ARTICLE
97—QUESTIONS TO DATA PROTECTION AUTHORITIES/EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
BOARD: ANSWERS FROM THE CZECH SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES 7 (2020), https://
edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/cz_sa_gdpr_art_97questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5V52-L8MX].
309. See RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 4; ANSWERS FROM GERMANY, supra note
286, at 5.
310. See RYAN & TONER, supra note 250, at 10.
311. See id. at 4–5.
312. INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., supra note 272, at 18–19.
313. HIPAA Enforcement, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcement/index.html#:~:text=HIPAA%20Enforcement,the%20Privacy
%20and%20Security%20Rules [https://perma.cc/HVG8-TAR2].
314. Shelby Hiter, GLBA Compliance & Standards, DATAMATION (July 2, 2021), https:/
/www.datamation.com/big-data/glba-compliance [https://perma.cc/74X5-HH84].
315. See Privacy and Security Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/7D6J-LRS2] (“When companies tell consumers they will safeguard their
personal information, the FTC can and does take law reinforcement action to make sure
companies live up [to] these promises. The FTC has brought legal actions against organizations that have violated consumers’ privacy rights, or misled them . . . .”).
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two major privacy laws—HIPAA and GLBA. Then, we turn to examine
the cost of enforcement for the regulatory agencies.
1. HIPAA Enforcement Costs
The OCR of DHHS enforces the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach
Notification Rules.316 The OCR also promotes broad awareness of
HIPAA rights and protections.317 It issues regulations and guidance, exacts civil monetary penalties, and pursues investigations and settlement
agreements.318 The OCR funds its HIPAA enforcement efforts through
the civil monetary settlement funds it collects and discretionary budget
allocations.319
FIGURE 21: HIPAA ENFORCEMENT BUDGET
TABLE320
Fiscal Year
Discretionary Budget
Authority
Civil Monetary Settlement
Funds
Total
Number of Employees
(Full-Time Equivalents)

AND

PERSONNEL—

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
$39M $39M $39M $39M $30M $30M
$24M $20M $8M $13M $23M $27M
$63M $59M $47M $52M $53M $57M
170

179

138

155

159

156

316. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUTTING AMERICA’S HEALTH FIRST: FY
2020 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FOR HHS 148 (2020) [hereinafter HHS BUDGET 2020].
317. Id.
318. Id. at 147–48.
319. See id. at 147.
320. Id. at 147–48; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUTTING AMERICA’S HEALTH
FIRST: FY 2021 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FOR HHS 171–72 (2020) [hereinafter HHS BUDGET
2021]; U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUTTING AMERICA’S HEALTH FIRST: FY 2019
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FOR HHS 124–25 (2018) [hereinafter HHS BUDGET 2019]; U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PUTTING AMERICA’S HEALTH FIRST: FY 2018
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FOR HHS 95–96 (2017) [hereinafter HHS BUDGET 2018].
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From 2016 to 2019, the OCR’s use of the Discretionary Budget remained consistent at $39 million but decreased to $30 million in 2020.322
The shortfall was more than made up for, however, by increased amounts
available for enforcement from the Civil Monetary Settlement Fund,
which amounted to $8 million, $13 million, and $23 million in 2017, 2018,
and 2019, respectively.323 The number of employees, however, has decreased overall in recent years.324
2. FTC and Privacy and Data Security Enforcement
In addition to the broad power it holds under the FTCA, the FTC also
enforces a variety of other statutes, including the GLBA, the Truth in
Lending Act, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography
and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.325 The FTC’s enforcement
thus addresses a wide range of privacy issues across a variety of industries, including social media, advertising technology, the mobile app
ecosystem, and even the internet of things.326
321. HHS BUDGET 2021, supra note 320, at 171–72; HHS BUDGET 2020, supra note
316, at 147–48; HHS BUDGET 2019, supra note 320, at 124–25, HHS BUDGET 2018, supra
note 320, at 95–96.
322. See supra Figure 21.
323. Id.
324. See supra Figure 22.
325. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE 1 (2019).
326. Id. at 2, 15.
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While the FTC’s overall enacted budget in fiscal year 2019 was $309.7
million with 1,130 full-time employees, its budget and staff for privacy
enforcement represents a small share of these larger totals.327 Despite an
increase in workload, the FTC’s budget for privacy enforcement remained remarkably stagnant until 2020, a year in which it also undertook
a record number of enforcement actions.328 The FTC raised its privacy
enforcement budget for 2021 to almost $13 million.329 The amounts still
seem grossly insufficient to undertake the enormous task of privacy enforcement across a nation the size of the United States.330
FIGURE 23: FTC SPENDING AND WORKFORCE DEDICATED
ENFORCEMENT331
Fiscal Year
Privacy and Identity
Protection
Number of Employees
(Full-Time Equivalents)

2016 2017

2018

2019

TO

2020

PRIVACY
2021

$10M $10.1M $9.9M $9.9M $12.6M $12.8M
57

54

52

52

61

61

327. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2021 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFI46 (2020) [hereinafter FTC FISCAL YEAR 2021 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION]
328. See id. at 5–16.
329. Id. at 121.
330. See generally Lindsey Barrett, Laura Moy, Paul Ohm & Ashkan Soltani, Illusory
Conflicts: Post-Employment Clearance Procedures and the FTC’s Technological Expertise,
35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (2021).
331. FTC FISCAL YEAR 2021 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 327, at 121; U.S. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 141 (2017)
[hereinafter FTC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION]; FED. TRADE COMM’N,
FISCAL YEAR 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 131 (2016) [hereinafter FTC
FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION].
CATION
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3. California Consumer Privacy Act
The California Department of Justice enforces privacy laws through its
Consumer Law Unit and its Privacy Unit.333 Even prior to the passage of
the CCPA, California had enforced various data protection laws including
the Data Breach Notification Statute.334 With the coming of the CCPA,
the California Department of Justice has requested an additional twentythree full-time employees at an estimated cost of approximately $4.5 million per year.335
C. ENFORCEMENT

IN

CHINA

Multiple agencies enforce Chinese privacy and cybersecurity law.
While China does not have any single “supervisory authority dedicated to
332. FTC FISCAL YEAR 2021 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 327, at 121; FTC
FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 331, at 141; FTC FISCAL YEAR
2017 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 331, at 131.
333. California Attorney General Creates Privacy Enforcement and Protection Unit,
WINSTON & STRAWN: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. L. BLOG (July 26, 2012), https://
www.winston.com/en/privacy-law-corner/california-attorney-general-creates-privacy-enforcement-and-protection-unit.html [https://perma.cc/9D25-8FFV].
334. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.25–1798.78 (requiring a business or a government agency
that owns or licenses unencrypted computerized data that includes personal information,
as defined, to notify any California resident whose unencrypted personal information was,
or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person).
335. Amy C. Pimentel, Little by Little, Attorney General Becerra Sheds Light on the
CCPA in 2020, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.mwe.com/insights/little-by-little-attorney-general-becerra-sheds-light-on-the-ccpa-in-2020 [https://
perma.cc/L92M-QS3L].
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the protection of personal information,”336 the Cyberspace Administration of China is generally considered the primary data protection authority in China.337 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(MIIT), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) also have significant regulatory and
enforcement roles with respect to data protection.338 Enforcement can
also occur at the provincial level.339 In addition, sectoral regulators, such
as the People’s Bank of China or the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, “may also monitor and enforce data protection issues
of regulated institutions within their sector.”340
In recent years, the Chinese government has launched campaigns
against the misuse of information by mobile apps.341 While the Cyberspace Administration of China’s campaign focused more on shutting
down apps, websites, and accounts that circulated pornography and “malicious programs,” MIIT, MPS, and SAMR worked to address the infringement of users’ rights and the illicit collecting of personal
information.342 The following table outlines the work of their campaigns.
FIGURE 25: MIIT, MPS,

AND

SAMR ENFORCEMENT CAMPAIGNS343

Ministry of Industry
and Information
Ministry of Public Security
Technology
(# of apps/websites)
(# of apps/websites)
Requested twenty-seven
companies to rectify
Requested 100+
problems; issued warnings
companies to rectify
against sixty-three
their policies on the
companies; fined ten
collection and use of
companies; commenced
personal data
criminal investigations into
two companies

State Administration
for Market
Regulation
(# of apps/websites)
Investigated 1,474
cases of consumer
information
infringement; fined
19.64+ million yuan

While there is no overall estimate of the amount China’s public sector
spends to enforce its Cybersecurity Law and regulations, many major cities and prefectures within China have established their own branch of the
Cyberspace Administration of China. The remit of these offices extends
beyond data privacy. The following table illustrates the expenditures of a
few of these offices for the 2020 fiscal year.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Pernot-Leplay, supra note 61, at 86.
DLA PIPER, supra note 223, at 158.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 164.
DAI & DENG, supra note 98, at 16–17.
Id.
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FIGURE 26: EXPENDITURES

OF

City or Province
Hubei Province
Yunan Province
Siping City
Chuxiong Yi Prefecture
Shanghai City
Suzhou City

Total Budget (USD/year)
$5.5M
$3M
$0.2M
$0.4M
$2.7M
$1.1M
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LOCAL CYBERSPACE ADMINISTRATION
BRANCHES
Population
58,500,000
48,300,000
594,000
2,684,000
24,280,000
10,720,000

V. CONCLUSION
Getting data privacy law right is critical for every country in the
twenty-first century. The digital economy depends on a proper legal
framework that protects privacy. Our study shows that even the expenditures from the United States and the European Union are not out of
reach for many developing nations to enforce data privacy law. Indeed,
the smallest European nations spend only half-a-million dollars annually
for their data privacy authority. Furthermore, while costs of compliance
for private businesses vary significantly, developing states can still take
steps, such as relaxed mandates for small- and medium-sized businesses
or ex post facto liability rules for negligent or intentional abuses of personal data. Developing states might also engage regionally and bilaterally
with other jurisdictions to effectively distribute the costs of enforcement
through systems of mutual recognition. Though the costs of compliance
may seem high, the costs of not having data privacy protection can be
quite high as well; a lack of protection could cause consumers and other
counterparties to avoid beneficial transactions because of the risks that
the information they share will be misused. Concerns over costs of compliance or costs of enforcement might be ameliorated if stronger data
protection laws make it easier for local businesses to participate in global
value chains.344
Based on the studies above and our discussions with experts, we offer a
few recommendations below, with the particular needs of developing
countries in mind.
Ensure Clear Rules. Rules should make it clear what companies can do
to reduce costs and increase compliance. Experts we spoke with commonly complained that it can be difficult to know how to comply with
both E.U. and Chinese data privacy law. The GDPR’s complex framework (there are 173 recitals, ninety-nine articles, and multiple guidance
344. See generally WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2020: TRADDEVELOPMENT IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS (2020).

ING FOR

2021]

Achieving Privacy

661

documents) generally requires expensive legal counsel to navigate.345
One interviewee noted that a hospital participating in a clinical research
trial with a drug company might be classified as a processor, joint controller, or controller in its own right, depending on which authority is interpreting the rules. A recent case from the Court of Justice of the European
Union requires companies to hire lawyers to give opinions on foreign intelligence laws of every country to which the companies are transferring
information outside of the European Union.346 For these companies, the
Chinese rules may be highly detailed, but that detail often exists in the
form of draft rules or guidelines rather than clearly binding law. This
makes it difficult to distinguish obligations from suggestions for best
practices.
Recognize cost of data localization. Data localization is a particularly
expensive and burdensome mandate. Rather than hosting their own servers or managing their own cybersecurity, businesses increasingly depend
on cloud service providers. Data localization imposes additional costs on
local micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), requiring them to
utilize local cloud services that are often more expensive than ones available globally. It can also harm domestic consumers and businesses by reducing the availability of foreign services if those services decide that they
do not wish to bear the expense or additional security risks of building or
renting a local data infrastructure. If the goal is to promote privacy and
security, governments should insist on both as the data travels abroad.
Strive for interoperability. Multiple sets of laws greatly magnify the
complexity and expense of privacy regulation. A company that complies
with the GDPR must still hire lawyers to comply with the local privacy
laws of all the jurisdictions in which it operates, despite having extensive
privacy protections in place already. Requiring a company that operates
in multiple jurisdictions to follow similar yet different laws raises compliance costs with little, if any, practical increase in privacy protections.
However, laws can be written to recognize compliance with foreign laws
as one method of complying with local law, thereby allowing companies
to reduce such costs and burdens. For example, a national privacy law
could declare that a company that complies with the GDPR, the
E.U.–U.S. Privacy Shield, or the CCPA automatically is also compliant
with that national privacy law. This would have the added benefit of encouraging global companies to offer services in that jurisdiction.
Consider burdens on small enterprises. Regulatory complexity poses a
special challenge for MSMEs that do not have the resources to hire lawyers to create tailored privacy programs; rework their information technology to allow for the realization of rights to access, correct, and delete
345. DATAGRAIL, supra note 126, at 9 (reporting that 56% of survey respondents indicated that the GDPR regulations are complex and/or vague and that 45% report that regulations lack a clear path to achieving compliance).
346. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. (Schrems II),
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 343 (July 16, 2020).
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information; and hire information security providers to protect data. It
may be difficult for those working in the informal sector, for example, to
comply with formal requirements such as notice (even an informal laborer may keep personal information about others, whether a friend or a
business counterparty, on their phone). One expert in Brazil noted that
under the current law, even the local baker might have to appoint a data
protection officer, at least until a federal regulator issues exemption for
such businesses. One response to this problem is to provide exceptions
for smaller enterprises from certain requirements. For example, the
CCPA only covers businesses that have $25 million or more in annual
revenue or that traffic in the personal information of at least 50,000
Californians.347 By contrast, the Nigerian Data Privacy Regulation sets a
much lower threshold, requiring data controllers who process the personal data of more than 2,000 subjects in a year to performs audits.348
Establish models conducive to cross-border data transfers. Many countries have modeled their laws after the GDPR, often in the hope of obtaining a favorable adequacy decision from the European Commission.
This is understandable because any such adequacy decision would enhance opportunities to receive personal information about E.U. residents,
making it easier to supply services to the large E.U. market. However, in
the quarter-century following the European Data Protection Directive,
only two developing countries, Argentina (in 2003) and Uruguay (in
2012) have received favorable adequacy decisions from the European
Union.349 Furthermore, the standard for receiving a favorable adequacy
decision only appears to have become stricter over time. Japan was recently recognized with an adequacy decision, but only after “80 rounds of
negotiations played out over 300 hours” taking place between April 2016
and January 2019.350 Only one country is currently being considered for
an adequacy decision: South Korea.351 An adequacy decision is not the
exclusive means to transfer personal data outside the European Union.
The GDPR permits a variety of mechanisms for cross-border transfer of
347. This latter figure is scheduled to go up to 100,000 when the California Privacy
Rights Act goes into effect.
348. Nigeria Issues New Data Protection Regulation, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIV.
& INFO. SEC. L. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/04/05/nigeria-issues-new-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.cc/VX3X-Q5GD].
349. Robert Carolina, Why the EU Has Issued Relatively Few Data Protection Adequacy Determinations? A Reply, LAWFARE (Jan. 13, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/why-eu-has-issued-relatively-few-data-protection-adequacy-determinations-reply
[https://perma.cc/3WV3-PR73] (observing that Uruguay sought the status because it hoped
to “attract business from Europe . . . that includes a large personal data processing component such as call centers, financial services, and telemedicine”).
350. Martin Braun, Frederic Louis & Itsiq Benizri, The European Commission Adopts
Adequacy Decision on Japan, WILMERHALE (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/
en/insights/blogs/wilmerhale-privacy-and-cybersecurity-law/20190124-the-european-commission-adopts-adequacy-decision-on-japan [https://perma.cc/Z867-EGYD].
351. See Joint Statement by Commissioner Reynders and Yoon Jong In, Chairperson of
the Personal Information Protection Commission of the Republic of Korea, EUROPEAN
COMM’N (Mar. 30, 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_21_1506 [https://perma.cc/AQZ8-DYKV].
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personal data, from Standard Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate
Rules to newer possibilities for certifications and codes of conduct.352
These mechanisms are likely to prove more realistic possibilities for developing countries than the hope for a favorable adequacy decision.
One possible alternative model might lie in the E.U.–U.S. Privacy
Shield, which was carefully negotiated between the United States and the
European Commission to protect the privacy of European Union residents when their information is transferred to the United States. The
Privacy Shield represents a kind of streamlined GDPR. Companies that
certified that they would comply with the extensive set of rules set forth
in the Privacy Shield were allowed to receive that data. Some 5,300 companies signed up, certifying compliance. On July 16, 2020, the Court of
Justice of the European Union struck down the E.U.–U.S. Privacy Shield
on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient legal rights to European
residents to challenge U.S. foreign surveillance.353 If that issue can be
resolved (through, for example, extending legal rights to challenge surveillance to foreigners), the Privacy Shield might serve as a useful model
for other nations to permit interoperability. Experts we spoke with affirmed that companies took compliance with the Privacy Shield seriously.
While the Privacy Shield was designed to facilitate cross-border transfer
of data from the European Union to the United States,354 it represents a
workable attempt to meet core E.U. concerns with data privacy in a way
that companies seem to manage; its principles could serve as a model for
national privacy laws themselves. Companies seeking to comply with the
Privacy Shield must (1) publish a privacy policy with certain specified information; (2) provide the option to opt-out (opt-in for sensitive data) for
disclosures to third parties or for uses for a materially different purpose
than that for which the data was provided; (3) enter into contracts to
protect data when sharing data with third parties or agents; (4) take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect security of data; (5) limit
processing to authorized purposes; (6) provide rights to access, correct,
amend, or delete data; and (7) provide recourse for complaints.355 In addition, companies must abide by sixteen supplementary principles.356
***
The study also reveals the need for further inquiry. Private companies
are reluctant to publish information about the costs of compliance, which
352. See GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 44–49. Our survey respondents indicated that they
rely principally on standard contractual clauses for cross-border data transfer from the
European Union.
353. See Anupam Chander, Is Data Localization a Solution for Schrems II?, 23 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 771, 774 (2020).
354. WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 344, at 245 (“The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield offers a
way of resolving the conflict between regulatory heterogeneity and international data
flows.”)
355. See Privacy Shield Overview, PRIV. SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://
www.privacyshield.gov/program-overview [https://perma.cc/Q5MY-XLRQ].
356. See id.
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might be perceived as either too little (by consumers) or too much (by
shareholders). Might particular data privacy obligations such as the right
to data access, to redress, to reasonable cybersecurity, for example, offer
particularly cost-effective privacy? Governments should review their own
enforcement efforts, including whether the resources they deploy are sufficient to regulate the growing digital economy. How effective are different types of government enforcement efforts (such as audits, sanctions, or
guidance regarding best practices)? Governments could gather more data
from companies on their compliance expenditures.
Understanding costs is a critical step towards achieving privacy.

